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Britain’s land use regulation (planning) system imposes very tight restrictions on the supply 
of office space so creating substantial rents. An unmeasured part of the costs associated with 
these restrictions likely comes from compliance costs, one form of which could be rent-
seeking activity (Krueger, 1974) of a gentlemanly form: employing a ‘trophy architect’ to get 
‘more rentable space’ on a given site (Cheshire & Hilber, 2008). This paper finds evidence 
strongly supportive of this hypothesis. It employs an hedonic approach on a sample of offices 
sold between 1998 and 2011, defining trophy architects (TAs) as those who had won a major 
lifetime achievement award. Much of London is covered by absolute height restrictions but 
outside these areas we show that i) for a given site a building designed by a TA is more 
valuable, but ii) this only arises because a TA squeezes more space on a given site – an extra 
19 stories, increasing the site value by an estimated 130 percent. Planning restrictiveness also 
varies within London by jurisdiction and the price of space is higher where restrictiveness is 
tighter. While these effects of trophy architects could be windfall gains to developers, we 
suggest a more likely interpretation is that they represent the additional but difficult to 
measure returns demanded for the extra risk and delays imposed by using a TA to try to game 
the system - hence a form of compliance cost and a deadweight loss associated with 
England’s planning system. 
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[the Minister]… “will only approve skyscrapers of exceptional design. For a building of this 
size to be acceptable, the quality of its design is critical… the proposed tower is of highest 
architectural quality” (Deputy Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, John Prescott, 2003) 
 
1. Introduction 
Tall buildings command a premium – often substantially greater than the cost of making them 
taller. The number of tall buildings per capita varies remarkably widely in cities around the 
world. We might expect there to be more in big cities, especially where such cities are 
crowded onto islands such as New York or Hong Kong or constrained by growth boundaries. 
But while the New York metro area is more than twice as populous as Hong Kong, Hong 
Kong has eight times as many skyscrapers1 – buildings over 100 metres tall – per person than 
New York. Sao Paulo has less than half the incidence of skyscrapers per person as New York, 
but curiously nearly 1.75 times as many high rise buildings – buildings over 35 metres. A 
medium sized, provincial city such as Brisbane, Australia, has six times as many skyscrapers 
per person as Paris and eight times as many as London. Topping all cities in the tall buildings 
league table is a real surprise: Benidorm in Spain. This is a small city with some 71,000 
residents but 1.15 times as many skyscrapers and nearly 17 times as many high rise buildings 
per resident as New York. In both these leagues, London, despite being the second largest in 
terms of population in its metro area and with one of the most tightly constraining growth 
boundaries in the world, comes right near the bottom. Sao Paulo, for example, with a 
comparable population has more than four times as many skyscrapers and nearly five times as 
many high rise buildings as London, while Houston, only 40% the size of London, has three 
and a half times as many skyscrapers per resident. The only tall building league London tops 
is the proportion of its skyscrapers designed by famous architects: on the definition used in 
this paper – nearly 25 percent compared to only 3 percent in Chicago and zero in Brussels or 
Benidorm. We will argue in this paper that while some of these across city differences are 
explained by size and some by topography a great deal is explained by regulation. 
 
An increasing volume of literature demonstrates that British land markets, and especially 
those in England, are some of the most tightly regulated in the developed world (Cheshire 
and Sheppard, 2002, 2005; Evans and Hartwich, 2005; Cheshire and Hilber, 2008; Hilber and 
1 Information on the number of skyscrapers or high rise buildings by city is from http://www.emporis.com/; data 
on population are from official figures and estimated to comparable metro areas, represented by Functional 
Urban Regions or Metropolitan Statistical Areas. 
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Vermeulen, 2012; Cheshire et al. 2013). Land supply for urban development has been highly 
constrained since 1947 and supply for each legal category of use is separately regulated. 
There are also tight regulations on building heights throughout Britain. The British land use 
regulation system is, moreover, representative of a system in which all decisions about 
significant development proposals are subject to individual decision by a political process 
known as ‘development control’ leading to uncertain outcomes and lengthy bargaining (Ball, 
2011). This is a quasi-judicial process and decisions can be appealed right up to national 
government with the final authority residing with the Cabinet minister responsible. The 
quotation at the head of this article is taken from such an appeal decision letter from the then 
responsible minister, John (now Lord) Prescott, deciding to override the rejection at the lower 
level and give development permission for the Shard – now the tallest building in London 
(indeed Europe).  
 
Given such a system it was not surprising that Cheshire and Hilber (2008) found the 
regulatory burden on office development in London was the highest estimated for any 
location in Western Europe. The measure used was the Regulatory Tax (RT) - the difference 
between the price of office space and its marginal construction costs2. Expressed as a 
percentage tax on marginal construction costs, over the period 1999-2005 in London’s West 
End, the RT averaged 809 percent (Cheshire and Hilber 2008). Even more surprisingly 
Cheshire and Hilber estimated an RT rate on offices in Birmingham - an economically 
depressed city in the British Midlands build on a flat plain – averaging 250% over 1999-
2005. No researcher has reported that regulatory restrictions in the US impose any RT on 
commercial development – usually attributed to the localised fiscal system that generates 
significant incentives for local communities to bid for commercial development, often by 
providing property tax exemptions. Cheshire and Hilber (2008) provided evidence that 
regulatory restrictiveness was the main cause of the high values of RT observed in Britain, 
although the change of business property taxes in 1990 from a partly local to an entirely and 
transparently national tax had also played a measurable part. 
 
We have, therefore, good evidence that the system of land use regulation in Britain raises the 
price of land available for development and creates very significant economic rents. As an 
example, if a landowner in many parts of southeast England could obtain permission to 
2 See Glaeser et al. (2005). 
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convert a hectare of agricultural land to housing its price would rise from some £10,000 to £8 
million overnight (VOA, 2012). In an influential paper Krueger (1974) pointed out that if 
regulatory restrictions create economic rents, people and economic agents will compete for 
them and compete in a variety of ways ranging from outright illegality via, for example, 
bribery or extortion (think the privatisation of former Soviet industries) to various more 
gentle and legal ways.  
 
Krueger’s context was physical, quantitative restrictions on imports in developing countries 
controlled by licenses (although this was suggested as representative of a wider range of 
government imposed quantitative restrictions). Whatever form the competition for such 
licenses took, however, she further demonstrated that the competitive rent-seeking behaviour 
it induced represented a deadweight loss and the outcome was suboptimal in welfare terms. 
Specifically that quantitative restrictions not only led to an economy producing inside its 
transformation curve but that such quantitative restrictions, under all circumstances, led to an 
outcome in welfare terms lower than would have been associated with tariffs having an 
equivalent impact on trade. 
 
Krueger’s model translates almost precisely into the context of British land use planning. In 
Britain we impose very tight restrictions on quantities of land (and space, via height 
restrictions) for every economic use but do not impose significant taxes. As Cheshire and 
Sheppard (2003) showed it is possible to restrict urban land take for residential use by i) 
direct quantitative controls; ii) taxing the development of ‘greenfield’ sites; or even iii) by 
taxing transport costs. Again, the conclusion was that if the goal was to restrict urban land 
take to any given level, doing so by imposing a tax on land consumption or even taxing 
transport costs produced superior welfare outcomes to physical restrictions. 
 
Despite the size of the economic rents potentially at stake, the British land use planning 
system appears to produce surprisingly few cases of proven corruption. The purpose of this 
paper is, however, to demonstrate that it does produce a more gentlemanly form of rent-
seeking behaviour on the part of developers: the employment of ‘trophy architects’ (TA) to 
game the system and allow the developer to squeeze more lettable space onto a given site. 
We find that such TAs do this by being able to build taller. We further show that the ability to 
get more building space onto a given site interacts with the local restrictiveness of the 
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planning system. Additional economic rents do not however arise from a higher price per 
square metre of space in a TA building: if anything such space is worth less, certainly for 
older buildings. The rents are acquired because buildings designed by TAs are systematically 
and very significantly bigger if located where there is any possibility of persuading decision 
makers to permit buildings to be taller. 
 
We then compare the direct costs of TAs – their buildings turn out to be more expensive per 
floor to build – with the value of the extra space they generate. We find that they appear to 
represent a hugely profitable form of not just rent-seeking but rent-acquisition for the 
developer. The extent to which this implies a lower level of welfare to the community at large 
depends in part, however, on what social value – if any – TA-designed buildings generate. 
While there is evidence that housing designed by outstanding architects (Ahlfeldt and 
Maennig, 2010; Ahlfeldt and Mastro, 2011) can raise values for surrounding residents as 
well, our data do not suggest that this is the case with commercial buildings: not only do 
buildings designed by TAs not command a premium per m2 but there is no evidence that, all 
else controlled for, being located with more listed buildings or more Conservation Area 
close-by increases a building’s price.  
 
A further issue is that we can only measure the direct costs associated with employing a TA, 
but it is likely that the British planning system imposes its own difficult to quantify costs due 
to the process of development control described above. Each stage of the planning decision is 
subject to uncertainty and appeal, and it is likely that large TA schemes will be subject to 
greater scrutiny and be appealed at every stage with a high probability that the final decision 
will ultimately be made by the Cabinet minister responsible. This adds legal costs and 
waiting time but also increases uncertainty implying developers would demand a higher 
realised rate of return when they successfully employ a TA as a means of getting permission 
to build extra space on a given site. Indeed if one were to make the opposite assumption – 
that there are no £50 notes lying around waiting to be picked up – then the rent we estimate 
for a representative site successfully developed using a TA is in fact a measure of these 
additional costs: costs which are the outcome of the value of the regulatory tax and, because 
decisions are not rule-determined but can be ‘negotiated’, of navigating the British planning 
system’s decision-making process while subject to the extra uncertainty imposed by taking 
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the TA route. Just as with rent-seeking behaviour these costs, however, will still be a 
deadweight loss in welfare terms. 
 
We use a data set of 515 individual office buildings. Since some were transacted more than 
once we have observations on 625 sales. We defined ‘trophy’ architect designed buildings 
blind of the data and as objectively as possible: buildings by an architect who at the time 
planning permission was granted had already won the most prestigious lifetime achievement 
award from one of the three major architectural bodies: the RIBA Gold Medal, AIA Gold 
Medal and the Pritzker Prize. While certainly giving a clear definition of ‘trophy’ architect it 
had the disadvantage that it restricted the number of such buildings to 51. This total includes 
buildings which were not sold and also some which by our definition of TA sales feature only 
in the sample of transacted buildings. Given this quite small sample, that the results are as 
significant and robust as they prove to be, one might even say reinforces their credibility. We 
test for their robustness by re-running the main models systematically dropping the tallest, 
two tallest and three tallest TA buildings and find that results do not change in any significant 
way. 
 
We are attributing causation: we believe the evidence very strongly supports the hypothesis 
that TAs are hired to game the planning rules and tend successfully to do so. The planning 
system in London is known to constrain the supply of office space (Cheshire & Hilber, 2008) 
and so generate ‘rents’ potentially available to those who successfully gain permission for 
extra office space. We also have qualitative evidence such as the quotation from the decision-
making Cabinet minister with which we introduce the paper. So we would strongly argue that 
this interpretation of our findings – that the employment of TAs is essentially a form of rent 
seeking behaviour – is the obviously plausible interpretation. Further circumstantial evidence 
in support of this interpretation is given by the findings with respect to the variations in local 
restrictiveness in planning across the Boroughs of London both in terms of the size of 
buildings and their value per square metre. There are, however, other conceivable 
explanations for the observed fact that TA buildings are so much bigger all else controlled for 
and are thus able to more than double the residual value of a site. It could be that high profile 
companies want to make design statements and so both employ TAs and commission bigger 
buildings; or it could be that only TAs have the capability to design big buildings. We look 
for evidence to support either of these possibilities and in effect find none. In the city with the 
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highest incidence of high rise buildings relative to population, Benidorm, there are none 
designed by TAs; in London, at the other extreme, a quarter of all skyscrapers are designed 
by TAs. 
 
We start by showing that a TA building provides more floorspace on a given site all else 
equal, and that this extra floorspace comes from building taller. We then analyse the impact 
of a TA’s building in terms of the price per m2 of built space and in terms of the price per m2 
of site area. In Section 5, we compare the increase in the value of the built space on a 
representative site in the City of London associated with a TA to the costs employing a TA 
imposes on a developer. We find that a TA is likely to earn a handsome rent for the developer 
although this conclusion does assume that the planning outcome is certain when a TA is 
employed – perhaps far too strong an assumption. Section 6 briefly reviews evidence that 
might support alternative causal explanations for what we observe but does not find any to 
undermine our interpretation. 
 
2. The Planning System in London 
To understand how the rents we claim arise are generated and how prestigious design can be 
used to seek them, it is essential to understand some details of England’s planning system and 
its particular features in London3. It rests on a process known as development control, 
exercised by the Local Planning Authority (LPA) which is the smallest governmental 
jurisdiction, in London, a Borough (although the Greater London Authority has some 
planning powers). There are 357 such LPAs in England and 14 within inner London. The 
framework and policies were established by the Town and Country Planning Act of 1947. 
This has been frequently added to and revised but to date not in ways which have changed its 
fundamental features. The main aims are to:  
 
1. Contain urban development with growth boundaries and Greenbelts. These Greenbelts 
cover an area some 1.5 times that of all urban areas in England together; 
2. Maintain green space within cities 
3. Separate conflicting uses (such as residential and industrial); 
3Planning in the three countries of Great Britain shares many features but there are specific differences, 
particularly in Scotland. There are also some particular features of planning in London, especially in the City of 
London and Docklands – see the text. 
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4. Require specific, legally defined, land use categories (such as retail, offices, light or 
heavy industry) to locate on particular sites or zones and allocate land and specific 
sites for those uses; 
5. Since 1996 require new development of ‘traditional town centre uses’ (especially 
retail) to be on designated sites in town centres; making out of town, large format 
retail development, including malls, in effect impossible; 
6. Restrict ‘over-development’ by means of ‘plot ratios’ – equivalent to Floor Area 
Ratios (FARs); despite this, since about 1990, planning policies have increasingly 
aimed at - 
7. Densification – by building at higher densities and by means of targeting new 
development to ‘brownfield’ sites; the original 60% brownfield target has been 
exceeded; 
8. Conservation of historic or interesting neighbourhoods or particular buildings either 
by means of; ‘Conservation Area’ status – where there are stringent restrictions to any 
development which would change the external appearance of an existing building or 
build taller than surrounding structures; by ‘Listing’ a particular building in which 
case restrictions on change are even tighter, covering internal as well as external 
appearance and structure; or by proximity to such structures or lying within protected 
long-distance viewing corridors of them. 
 
While planning policy as currently observed was effectively established in 1947, there were 
earlier legal provisions with some features of planning going back to the 19th century. In 
London there were particular such provisions relevant to this paper. Before about 1875 
finance and technology restricted building heights but the invention of lifts (elevators) and 
steel frames (see Turvey, 1998) allowed for much taller buildings. Height and building sizes 
first became strictly controlled in London following the London Council Act of 1890, which 
set a statutory limit of 27m plus two-storeys in the roof; decreased in 1894 to 24m and 6m to 
the rooftop (Inwood, 2005; Simon, 1996). Absolute height limits were introduced on grounds 
of safety as a result of lobbying from the London Fire Brigade who did not possess ladders 
long enough to evacuate taller structures4. Therefore neither skyscrapers – nor anything 
resembling skyscrapers – were built in London until after 1956, when the widespread 
4 Although urban legend has it that Queen Victoria took exception to tall buildings after the construction of 
Queen Anne’s Mansions in 1873 blocked her view of parliament from Buckingham Palace. 
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availability of fire lifts made it impossible to continue to defend antiquated height 
restrictions.  
 
Plot-ratio restrictions5 introduced in the 1951 London County Council Development Plan 
remained in force, however. For most areas in London the allowable plot-ratio was 5:1, for 
central areas of the City, close to the Bank of England, the allowed ratio was 5½:1; for other 
areas, deemed sensitive to increased density, the restriction was set at 2:1 (City of London, 
2010). Nonetheless these plot-ratios were regularly circumvented by developers skilled in 
exploiting loopholes in planning law such as the notorious Third Schedule (Marriott, 1989, 
p.171) and increasingly overridden by government dispensation (House of Commons, 2002). 
Thus it was not until the 1960s that any London building was allowed to be taller than St 
Pauls Cathedral – completed in 1710. Although these plot-ratios were gradually removed by 
LPAs during the 1980s and 1990s in favour of the current discretionary system of 
development control, to this day there are protected sight corridors along which no building 
may be higher than the base of the dome of St Pauls (see Figure 2), and additional height 
restricted zones specified for areas surrounding the London Monument, the Tower of 
London, the Thames River, and a number of historic and skyline features (City of London, 
2012). 
 
To summarise, therefore, the planning and related policies that are strictly relevant for the 
analysis in this paper are: 
1. Decisions on development applications are rendered by means of ‘development 
control’ – so decisions to permit any legally defined development are discretionary 
and subject to appeal, rather than rule-governed, except for the rules identified in 
points 3 and 4 below. This process is quasi-judicial in character and ultimate power of 
decisions rests with the responsible Cabinet minister when the appeal process is 
exhausted6; 
2. Absolute height restrictions for ‘safety reasons’ prior to 1956; 
5 More commonly known outside the UK as floor-area ratios (FAR), plot-ratios are an implicit restriction on 
permissible building height. 
6 Development has a legal definition under the 1947 Act and subsequent amendments to that Act. In effect it 
relates to any change of use of an existing plot of land or building not exempt. Very small extensions or 
alterations outside Conservation Areas are exempt but all office construction or change of use from, say, a shop 
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3. Plot-ratios restricting the allowable floor area on a given site thereafter until the 1980s 
and 1990s; 
4.  Binding height restrictions within; Conservations Areas, Protected views of St Pauls, 
the Monument, the Tower of London, the Thames Policy area, and an absolute ban on 
the re-development of the numerous listed buildings in Central London.  
3. Data 
Descriptive statistics are shown in Tables 1 and 2. 
 
3.1 Sample of buildings and sales 
Data on office building characteristics and sale prices were obtained from Estates Gazette 
(EG) and Real Capital Analytics (RCA). Combined, the EG and RCA data sum to 2,932 
unique sales in central and outer London between 1998 and 2011. This dataset however had 
to be cleaned and supplemented with additional information about individual buildings. 
Several ‘offices’ turned out to be small parts of buildings, above apartments, for example. We 
restricted the sample to buildings which were purpose-built office buildings or now 
predominately used as office space with only minor other uses – flats, shops or restaurants – 
within them. We also discarded all buildings – only a handful – outside Inner London7, and 
sales which occurred less than 12 months following the previous sale (Clapp and Giacotto, 
1999). The location of buildings in the sample is shown in Figure 1. The resulting final 
number of distinct buildings was 515 which, allowing for those sold more than once, yielded 
a total of 625 sales.  
 
3.2 Trophy Architects 
Architectural excellence is necessarily a subjective judgment but peer recognition seems the 
most objective measure available. We have taken the lifetime achievement awards from 
Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA), the American Institute of Architects (AIA), and 
the Pritzker Prize as the most prestigious and obvious recognition of architectural excellence 
within the architectural community. We deem winners of these awards to be ‘trophy 
architects’ (TA). We adopt this term partly because if the purpose of employing a TA is to 
improve the developers’ chances of building bigger, the lifetime achievement award will 
have strong signalling power of architectural merit to planners and politicians making 
7 For the relevant definition of Inner London see Dericks (2013). 
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decisions. For regressions on building size, buildings are recognised as designed by ‘TAs’ if 
the architect’s first TA award was conferred before the building in question received planning 
permission. For the regressions involving building sales, a sale is defined as a TA sale if the 
architect received their first TA award before the building was sold. Additionally, for both the 
sales and size regressions the architect who won the relevant TA award must have been alive 
and working at the time the building was designed8. Given this additional criterion and the 
exclusivity of these awards the number of potential TA buildings is limited. Nevertheless we 
have been able to identify and acquire the necessary attributes on 43 TA buildings for the size 
analyses and 58 sales of such buildings during the period covered by our data9. Of the 43 
buildings designed by TAs in the size sample, 7 were built before 1956 (between 1870 and 
1928), and therefore in an era when available technology or statutory regulations absolutely 
restricted their height. These pre-1956 buildings are referred to as ‘Pre-Modern’ TA buildings 
in contrast to ‘Modern’ TA buildings. 15 of the 36 modern TA buildings are located outside a 
height protected area and so had potential flexibility with respect to their size via the process 
of development control and appeal. 
 
3.3 Spatial units 
Data has been assembled from various sources and for different spatial units. These include;  
 
Administrative Regions: London LPAs, responsible, for example, for the implementation of 
planning policy. The sample of 515 buildings falls in ten LPAs of inner London 
corresponding to the primary locations of office buildings; the City of London, the City of 
Westminster, Tower Hamlets (containing the Docklands), Southwark, Lambeth, Kensington 
and Chelsea, Hammersmith and Fulham, Islington, Hackney, and Camden. Although the 
sample of 515 buildings is spread across 10 LPAs, 84% of the 515 are located in just four: the 
City of Westminster, Camden, Islington, and the City of London. 
 
8 Notably the ‘alive and working’ stipulation removes all buildings in London designed by the prominent 
architectural firm Skidmore, Owings, & Merrill; three of whose principal partners would have been considered 
trophy architects while active. 
9 The 51 trophy architect buildings which comprise our 43 size and 58 sales observations were designed by; 
Norman Foster (14), Richard Rogers (8), Cesar Pelli (3), Denys Lasdun (3), Edwin Lutyens (3), Aston Webb 
(2), Renzo Piano (2), James Stirling (2), John Belcher (2), Thomas Edward Colcutt (1), Rem Koolhas (1), Jean 
Nouvel (1), Ieoh Ming Pei (1), Michael and Patricia Hopkins (1), Ralph Erskine (1), Howard Robertson (1), 
Albert Richardson (1), William Curtis Green (1), John James Burnet (1), Reginald Blomfield (1), and Alfred 
Waterhouse (1). The building size sample of TAs is not a subset of the building sales sample because some 
buildings had architects who had not yet won an applicable TA award at the time they were designed, but had 
done so by the time the building in question was sold. 
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Postcode sectors: these areas, much smaller than LPAs, were used to construct the 
employment density variable explained below. In Greater London 546 had a sampled 
property in, or within, 2km of its boundary. A map of these 546 postcode sectors and the 
locations of sampled buildings is shown in Figure 1. 
 
GIS Data 
Digital Ordinance Survey data was used to locate all stations, parks, public gardens and water 
ways or bodies of water. It was also used to calculate the area of the site on which each 
building was located and building footprints. 
 
3.4 Planning data 
Important to the work was information on the operation of the planning system and on the 
historic conservation designations discussed above. Data on Conservation Areas was 
acquired from English Heritage as was data on the ‘Listed’ status of buildings. Of the 515 
buildings in the sample, 50% are located within a Conservation Area and 14% are Listed.  
 
As Table 3 shows, a large percentage of the total land area in the four LPAs where the great 
majority of our sampled buildings were located is covered by Conservation Areas. 
 
The variable Conservation density 300m was approximated by randomly adding one point for 
each 100m2 of Conservation Area within each Conservation Area’s perimeter, with a 
minimum distance between points of 4m, and then calculating the number of points which 
fell into a 300m radius of each building. The variable Listed building density 300m was 
calculated by spatially matching the point map of Listed buildings from English Heritage 
with the Ordnance Survey containing a map of each building’s site (or plot). Then a point 
was randomly placed within each Listed building’s site for every 10m2 of its total area, with a 
minimum inter-point distance of 1m. The number of such points which fell within 300m of 
each office building in the sample was then summed to create the variable. 
 
For the analyses of the effects of Height Protected Area status on building size, buildings are 
recognized as such if they were built within any of the following areas after the relevant 
height restriction came into force; Conservation Areas, St Pauls Heights Policy Area, 
Monument Viewing Corridors, Tower of London Local Setting, London Strategic Viewing 
Corridors, Thames Policy Area, or areas deemed sensitive due to proximity to historic or 
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landmark structures. A current map of these areas is presented in Figure 2. For the price 
models, buildings were only defined as located in a Conservation Area if the building was 
located within a Conservation Area at the time of sale.  
 
3.5 Parks and Gardens 
A digital map of London’s parks and gardens was acquired from English Heritage. The 
variable Parks and gardens density was calculated by placing a random point within the 
perimeter of each park or garden for each 10m2, with a minimum distance between points of 
1m. Then the total number of points within a 300m radius of each office property was 
counted. This distance was chosen for Parks and garden, Conservation, and Listed building 
density as in each case it performed better in our hedonic model than 100m or 500m radii. 
 
3.6 Planning Permission Refusal Rate 
London Boroughs, the LPAs, have varying degrees of regulatory restrictiveness. We use data 
on office planning refusal rates from 1990 to 2008 for all ten Boroughs covering the 515 
properties in the sample obtained from the data generated by Hilber and Vermeulen (2012). 
As has been discussed widely in the literature (Cheshire and Sheppard, 1989; Hilber and 
Vermeulen, 2012; or Cheshire et al. 2013) planning permission refusal rates are potentially 
endogenous. Since planning applications cost considerable resources would-be developers 
will likely adjust their application submissions depending on the expected restrictiveness of 
the LPA in question. Two London LPAs have exceptional planning regimes (the City of 
London and the Docklands – within the Borough of Tower Hamlets – but for most of its 
effective development covered by a special purpose planning authority – the London 
Docklands Corporation) so measured ‘planning restrictiveness’ may imply something rather 
different in these two areas. Both the issue of endogeneity and this caveat must be borne in 
mind. Because of the special planning regimes in the City of London and the Docklands, 
specific dummies are included in the building size models for these LPAs. 
 
3.7 Employment Density 
The most detailed statistics on the location of employment in London are those for postcode 
sectors from the NOMIS Annual Business Inquiry (ABI) Employee Analysis. This data 
begins in 2000 and the most recent collected for this analysis is for 2008. Following Wheaton 
et al. (1997) who found that the primary driver of office demand in London was financial and 
business services employment, we only include employment in those sectors in our measure; 
14 
 
‘Iconic Design’ as deadweight loss: rent acquisition by design in the constrained London office 
market 
 
that is from employees in 2003 SIC codes J or K, corresponding to banking, finance, business 
services and insurance. There is a structural break in the data between 2005 and 2006. We 
therefore re-scaled our 2006-08 post-code sector values pro rata using the scaling factor 
provided by the ONS for London SIC codes J and K.  
 
Using the resulting data a map of employment density was constructed from the 546 postcode 
sectors mapped in Figure 1. Water features, Parks and Gardens, and the Barbican residential 
development were then removed to eliminate the areas where office employees could not be 
located. Then the number of points corresponding to the employment counts within the 
remaining boundaries of each of the 546 postcode sectors were randomly placed within each 
boundary for each year between 2000 and 2008, and then the number of employees within a 
radial buffer of 600m from each property at the year of sale was calculated. 600m was chosen 
after all employment densities between 100-1,000m in 100m increments, 1500m, and 2000m 
were separately tested in the hedonic model, and it was found that coefficient size and 
statistical significance peaked at 600m and declined monotonically in both directions from 
there. Previous empirical studies of the effect of employment density on value such as 
Arzaghi and Henderson (2008) or Jennen and Brounen (2009) found that employment within 
500m of office buildings corresponded to the optimal radial bandwidth for New York and 
Amsterdam. 
 
For our building size analyses, because the employment density measure was only available 
from 2000 while many of the buildings were built before the 20th century, the average 600m 
employment density between 2000 and 2008 is used as a proxy for the employment density 
relevant for the building at the time of construction. 
 
For regressions utilising building sale-prices as the dependent variable, the corresponding 
employment density at the time of sale was calculated as a fractionally time-weighted 
average of the current (at time-of-sale) and previous year employment density levels, 
weighted pro rata according to the number of months elapsed between the sale and the month 
(September) that ABI surveys were administered. Buildings sold before September 2000 and 
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We note that employment density as measured is to some extent definitionally endogenous 
with respect to building size since employment in the building in question is included in the 
postcode sector’s employment count. So in effect, every building adds to its own density, and 
therefore big (occupied) buildings help cause higher density as measured in the ABI survey. 
In practice this effect is likely to be small, however, since the average employment count per 
600m radial distance from each property over the period 2000-08 is 47,971 and a reasonable 
estimate of the average number of workers in a fully occupied building is 58310 – or 1.22% of 
the total number of employees in the average 600m radial zone. There could also be an issue 
of endogeneity as a result of unobserved physical and environmental characteristics 
influencing the colocation of both employment and larger/more expensive office buildings. 
However, to the extent that these unobserved characteristics are correlated with employment 
density, this relationship merely serves to improve the function of employment as a 
‘portmanteau’ control variable in our analyses (Ioannidis and Silver, 1999)11. 
 
3.8 Access to Labour Force 
Access to the labour force is estimated by taking the distance in metres to the nearest 
underground or other rail station. Although simple, this statistically outperforms other 
apparently more sophisticated measures of buildings’ accessibility to the labour force (see 
Dericks, 2013). 
 
3.9 Submarket Area 
Submarkets were defined according to Estates Gazette’s market definition shown below. 
 
City Core: EC1A, EC2M, EC2N, EC2R, EC2Y, EC2V, EC2A (only Finsbury Pavement, 
Finsbury Square, Appold Street and Chiswell Street), EC3, EC4 (excluding EC4A & 
EC4Y) 
City Fringe: EC1M, EC1N (excluding postcode sector 2), EC1R, EC1V, EC1Y, EC2A 
(excluding Finsbury Pavement, Finsbury Square, Appold Street and Chiswell Street), E1 
Southbank: SE1 postcode sectors, 0, 1, 2 & 9 
Docklands: E14 
10 The average building size in the sample is 10,496m2. If we take a very dense working environment of 18m2 
per worker, that leaves us with an average of some 583 workers per building 
11 Only if we were interested in the pure effect of employment density on building prices or size would this 
potential endogeneity need to be addressed.  
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Midtown: EC4A & EC4Y, EC1N (postcode sector 2), WC1, WC2 (excluding Leicester 
Square) 
West End: W1, SW1, NW1 sectors 2 (Euston Road only), 3, 5 & 6, Leicester Square 
(WC2) and W2 sectors 1, 2 & 6 
South Central: Remainder of SE1 and all of SE11 
North Central: Remainder of NW1 and N1 and all of E8 
West Central: Remainder of W2 and all of W6, W8, W14, SW3, SW5, SW6, SW7 & 
SW10 
 
3.10 Building Characteristics 
Data on building characteristics such as its age, the number of floors12, the number of 
basements, single or multi-tenant, and air conditioning (A/C) was gathered from Estates 
Gazette, Real Capital Analytics, internet research, and site visits to each building. The quality 
measure comes from Estates Gazette, which grades each floor of a building either A or B. 
Buildings with only grade A space are graded as an A, both A and B space graded as A/B, 
and B space only is the omitted dummy variable. 
 
Whereas most hedonic studies include a building’s age and possibly a dummy variable 
indicating whether the building has ever been refurbished, we try here to use a more accurate 
measure for obsolescence by calculating the number of years at the time of sale since the 
building had been built or last refurbished. This variable is called Depreciation Age. 
Additionally, a dummy for the decade in which the building was constructed is included. 
 
3.11 Time-Dummies 
Time-dummies are fractionally time-weighted as set out in Dericks (2013), allowing the price 
change between 1997-98 to be estimated in spite of no observations sampled before 1998, 
and reducing temporal aggregation bias in price estimates (Geltner, 1993). 
 
  
12 Like employment density the number of floors may also be endogenous with respect to prices (see Koster et 
al, 2011). Although suitable instruments for the number of floors were not found, this should not be problematic 
as the focus of this study is not the estimation of the causal relation between floor height and sale price. 
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4.1 Can TAs build bigger? 
The first question is whether TAs have been able to build more office space on a given plot of 
land since 1956, when binding height restrictions were lifted. Before 1956 the height of a 
building – no matter who designed it – was fixed by either statutory regulations or technology 
so we do not expect to find any TA effect for buildings built before that year. We also do not 
expect to find that even the most acclaimed architects would have been able to flex the 
regulations governing the height and appearance of buildings built in a designated Height 
Protected Area13. We test this hypothesis for both height alone and for total floorspace 
relative to site size. The results are reported in Tables 4, 5 and 6.  As will be obvious we are 
attempting to identify a TA effect off a small sample of, in effect, 15 buildings. This point is 
addressed below and in Tables A1 to A3. 
 
Table 4 reports the results where total floorspace relative to site area is the dependent 
variable. Model 1 simply lumps all TA buildings together. We see that these buildings are 
indeed significantly bigger. Since we only expect TAs to be able to build bigger outside a 
Height Protected Area and after 1956, Model 2 interacts a Modern TA dummy for the 
building with built outside a Height Protected Area14. The results are stronger and the 
interacted TA effect is significant at the 1 percent level, while the uninteracted TA effect 
fades; confirming that the ability of a TA to get more space on a site is indeed confined to 
sites outside Height Protected Areas. We also see that buildings tend to have less floorspace 
on a given site the more restrictive the local planning system. Subsequent models add the 
decade in which the building was constructed, dummies for the City of London and 
Docklands, and then in Model (5), the local density of employment around the building. The 
basic results are confirmed – indeed become more significant. 
 
Given the relatively small number of TA buildings outside a Height Protected Area there has 
to be concern as to the robustness of these findings. The results reported in Table A1 provide 
some robustness checks. We apply the quite stringent test of successively dropping the tallest 
TA building outside a Height Protected Area, then the second tallest and then the third tallest. 
Very reassuringly almost nothing changes – even parameter estimates – except obviously the 
13 Though we have found one exception - New Court, St Swithin’s Lane by Rem Koolhas was built in a 
Conservation Area. 
14 Namely; (Building designed by TA) x (Outside Height Protected Area). 
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estimated extent of the additional floorspace a TA generates for a given site outside a Height 
Protected Area. 
 
The way TAs succeed in getting more office space on a given site is revealed in Table 5. 
They are extremely successful at building taller. They can add on average 19 extra floors to a 
building outside a Height Protected Area. If we assume 4 vertical metres per floor, that would 
mean that office buildings built by a TA outside a Height Protected Area are on average 76m 
taller than buildings designed by standard architects. Recall that 30m was the maximum 
permissible total height of all buildings built between 1894 and 1956. 
 
Corroborating results reported in Table 4, the un-interacted TA dummy has no effect on 
building height. It is only outside Height Protected Areas that TAs can successfully exert 
their influence on the planning system. Indeed within Height Protected Areas all office 
buildings tend to be lower and the effect of a more restrictive local planning regime 
disappears. Local employment density is significantly and positively related to building 
height. As before results are not affected by successively dropping the tallest buildings from 
the model (see Table A2). 
 
That TAs are able to build taller buildings does not exclude the possibility that a part of their 
ability to get more floorspace on a given site stems from being able to squeeze a larger 
footprint for a given total site area too. The results for testing this idea are shown in Table 6, 
and it appears that if anything TAs in general build at lower footprint to site area ratios. The 
effect of other variables on the size of the building footprint relative to that of the site remain 
much as previous results would lead one to expect. More restrictive LPAs are still associated 
with smaller building footprints other things controlled for. 
 
There is, of course, what might be thought of as a natural limit to the footprint/site area ratio: 
it cannot exceed a value of 1. But even here ingenuity by design could triumph. There is an 
interesting exception to this rule currently under construction in the City of London – the 36-
floor ‘Walkie-talkie’ building designed by aspirant TA Rafael Viñoly. This building has a 
tapered base but bulges outwards towards its roof, and so while its footprint/site ratio is still 
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4.2 What is the value associated with a TA? 
Having established that where there is any flexibility in London’s land use planning system, 
TAs are able to get more space on a given site by building a great deal taller than regular 
architects can, the issue is what value does this generate? More rentable space will add to the 
sale price of a building, other things equal, but other factors associated with TA design might 
increase construction costs, raise or reduce the rent per m2 or increase maintenance costs. A 
less conventional layout might reduce the rent per m2 or reduce the proportion of space that 
was lettable; unconventional building materials or design might impose additional 
maintenance costs (for example, the costs of cleaning angled windows in Norman Foster’s 
40-floor Gherkin building). There might also be a greater chance of the building becoming 
‘Listed’ and therefore impossible to either adapt or redevelop – effectively freezing the use of 
the site in perpetuity and so eliminating any redevelopment option value. 
 
We address this issue by means of a ‘classic’ hedonic model. We fully recognise the potential 
problems of omitted variables but our focus of interest is on several characteristics of 
buildings and their settings at the same time and also on specific price estimates. These allow 
us in the next section to compare the gross value of the ‘rents’ associated with employing a 
TA in a highly regulated environment with the costs of the TA. We have, however, made 
great efforts to seek out as wide a range of relevant control variables as possible to mitigate 
problems associated with omitted variables. 
 
Results are reported in Tables 7 and 8. Note that whereas previously we have been analysing 
the physical characteristics of 515 buildings, the sample size now consists of the 625 sales of 
completed between 1998 and 2011. We are measuring ‘price’ in terms of the capital value of 
transacted buildings. White tests do not reject homoskedasticity, and so normal standard 
errors are reported. 
 
The dependent variable in the models reported in Table 7 is the price per m2 of the building – 
so we are abstracting from the size effect that TAs achieve. Models 1 to 4 of Table 7 are 
identical save that they variously include decade built and submarket dummies. In Model 1 
we observe parameter estimates which in most cases conform to priors and are significant. 
Some wholly insignificant variables are not shown: for example in no models experimented 
with did the number of parking spaces have any significant effect on the price per m2 of 
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buildings. This is perhaps not surprising for London given the reliance on public mass transit 
for commuting to work and the congestion charge on cars using the central zone where 
almost all the buildings are located.  Otherwise the price per square metre rises significantly 
as the restrictiveness of the local planning regime becomes tighter, the higher is local 
employment density, if the building is within a Conservation Area (but being surrounded by a 
higher density of Conservation Areas does not significantly affect the price), and the more 
Listed buildings there are in the local area. More area of parks and gardens around the 
building add to its value as does its height (there is, in London, a documented rental premium 
for higher floors briefly discussed in Cheshire and Hilber 2008; see Koster et al., 2013 for a 
more detailed analysis), the better the state of the building and its reported quality. Not 
surprisingly price paid per m2 rises with the proportion of the structure occupied and being let 
to a single tenant also increases value.  
 
The impact of a building being Listed, while never substantial, varies with how the model is 
formulated.  In the first two models being Listed suggests the building will have a higher 
value, but this effect disappears when submarket and the period of construction are controlled 
for. However, when TA is split between Modern and Pre-Modern, the Listed building 
premium again becomes significant. As the majority of Pre-Modern TA buildings are listed 
(5 of 7), it is possible that the Pre-Modern TA effect is confounding the earlier estimations of 
the Listed coefficient. Having more Listed buildings in the vicinity of the building sold seems 
to increase its value, but this effect disappears entirely when the ‘black-box’ submarket 
dummies are included. Perhaps the least expected finding is that proximity to rail stations has 
no significant effect on building price. This may be due to multicollinearity with the 
employment density measure, however. Not only is it likely that higher employment densities 
and rail stations tend to be co-located but there would be a clear issue of causation if we were 
trying to identify the impact of either on building values. Nevertheless local employment 
density is consistently significant; suggestive evidence of localised agglomeration economies.  
 
The point of interest here, however, is the impact on price per m2 of being designed by a TA. 
Looking at the first four models this appears to be entirely non-significant. It makes no 
statistically significant difference to the price per m2 at all. However in Model (5), reported in 
the final column, when TA buildings are divided between modern and pre-modern there is a 
significant negative discount on price per square metre of pre-modern TA buildings. This 
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discount may arise because such buildings are both obsolete in design and especially 
defended from modernisation due to their TA status. We also checked for possible interaction 
between the TA variables and the proportion of the building occupied on the grounds that TA 
design might impact on occupancy rates achieved at time of sale. There turned out to be no 
such affect so this source of possible bias is not relevant. 
 
Thus TAs – at least those building in the modern era – do not appear to have any significant 
impact on the unit price of space in the buildings they design. But we have already seen that 
they achieve larger – notably taller – buildings on a given site if that site is not in a height 
restricted zone including Conservation Areas. So now let us turn to the impact that they have 
on the total value of a building on a given site. The results are reported in Table 8 where the 
dependent variable is the price paid for the building per unit area of its site.  
 
The models follow closely those reported in Table 7 but include whether the building was 
inside a Height Protected Area when constructed and also interacts this with whether 
designed by a TA. In effect we are analysing here what net effect more space has on the total 
price paid for an office building on a given site.  
 
Not very surprisingly given previous findings we observe that sites of a given area with TA 
buildings outside a Height Protected Area are worth significantly more: the buildings on such 
sites are taller so there is more lettable space in them. Inside Height Protected Areas TAs do 
not affect the price per m2 of sites in a statistically significant way although there is perhaps 
some indication that buildings designed by pre-modern TAs have a negative influence on site 
values; although never statistically significant, parameter values are consistently negative. 
 
Other variables in Table 8 tend to be less significant than those for the unit price of space 
within buildings shown in Table 7. The positive effect of a more restrictive local planning 
regime continues to be associated with an increase in site values all else controlled for.  Local 
employment density and local concentrations of parks and gardens remains significant as 
does the impact of the rated quality of space and the proportion occupied. However the 
‘depreciation age’ is rather less significant and the impact of surrounding Listed buildings 
and Conservation Areas is weakened when period of construction and submarket area are 
controlled for.  
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We see that in all specifications the interactive benefit of a TA building built outside a Height 
Protected Area (and so getting those extra floors on a given site associated with such 
buildings) outweighs any potential drawbacks such as additional maintenance costs 
associated with its design. However the total effect on a building’s price relative to the size of 
its site, if it is designed by a TA outside a Height Protected Area, is the value of the TA and 
‘TA outside Height Protected Area’ coefficients summed. In the most preferred specification 
– reported as Model 4 – the net effect of these two factors is approximately 0.83, or,  given 
the semi-log specification, roughly a 130% increase in building price for a given site size15. 
Buildings inside a Height Protected Area, however, do not get the extra floors associated with 
TAs outside these areas, and so there would be a net cost associated with employing a TA to 
design a building there. 
 
We experimented16 with including the number of above ground floors to see if this would, so 
to speak, steal the ‘TA outside a Conservation Area’ effect. It did – consistent with the 
previous interpretation of results reported in Table 8: that the extra value TAs achieve 
designing a building located outside a Height Protected Area stems from their ability to flex 
the planning system and build taller.  
 
Finally (see Table A3) we tested the robustness of the results by successively dropping the 
tallest TA buildings from the sample. Table A3 Model 1 repeats the estimate of Table 8 
Model 4. We can see from this table that as the tallest, then two and three tallest buildings, 
are dropped the estimates remain reassuringly unchanged and still significant. In effect the 
results are not sensitive to eliminating observations despite the relatively small number of TA 
buildings and despite dropping the tallest buildings selectively.  
 
Taken together, although it appears that TAs have no significant influence on the price per 
unit of floorspace, because of the fact that they can stack more units of floorspace on a given 
amount of land they are, overall, able to increase the price of a building built on that land, so 
long as the site is outside a Height Protected Area where building height becomes in some 
sense, negotiable. 
 
15 See Kennedy (1981) for this calculation. 
16 Results available from the authors. 
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5. What is the net value of rents obtainable by design? 
This, however, is only part of the story. TAs may be able to generate more value but they also 
cost more. From Table 5 we know that TAs outside a Height Protected Area can increase the 
number of floors in their buildings by approximately 19. This would mean that employing a 
TA would allow a developer to go from a typical allowable building height of 8 floors (our 
sample mean) to 27 floors. Just how valuable is this increase in floorspace to a developer 
once any extra costs, explicitly associated with TA building and design have been paid? In 
order to address this question we use data on; (i) permissible development area land cost, (ii) 
gross internal area construction costs for standard and TA designed office buildings by 
height, (iii) design fees for standard and trophy architects, and (iv) net-to-gross floorplate 
ratios by building height – that is the ratio of lettable space to gross internal area17. All office 
construction cost data were provided by the construction consultants Gardiner & Theobald. 
The hypothetical building in question is supposed to have a 1,600m2 footprint (i.e. 40m a side 
squared), a 2,000m2 site area (our sample mean), and to be located in the City of London18.  
 
The data from Gardiner & Theobald show that construction costs per m2 rise fastest going 
from 20 to 30 floors, but are comparatively flat for buildings both below and above this 
height. This relationship is graphed in Figure 3 with the net lettable-to-gross floorspace ratio 
also shown as a function of the number of floors. 
 
Adding land and design costs to construction costs gives us an estimate for the total building 
cost. However, TAs charge a premium compared to standard architects for their design fees, 
and the buildings they design will generally incur additional construction costs over-and-
above that of a standard building. Figure 4 shows estimates of the total construction costs for 
a standard office building, and an expensive and ‘cheap’ TA office building. The expensive 
and cheap TA buildings assume upper and lower bound estimates for land and trophy 
construction costs, respectively. 
17 As buildings increase in height each floor must allocate a greater percentage of space to structural support, 
plant operations, and additional lifts. This requirement reduces the ratio of lettable floorspace to gross internal 
area as the building increases in height. For instance, using a reduced sample of 387 buildings, a regression of 
the number of lifts on the number of floors, holding footprint constant, shows that on average for every 5-floor 
increase in height, buildings are provided with 2 additional lifts (see Dericks, 2013). It is easy to see how as a 
building gets taller its lettable office space is gradually ‘hollowed out’ by these and other structural 
requirements. 
18 The City of London was chosen as it is the historic financial centre of London and one of two prominent tall 
building locations, the other being Canary Wharf (Docklands). 
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The next step derives estimates for the sale-price that can be achieved once a building is built 
and let. To construct these estimates we use the coefficients in Table 7, Model (5), and apply 
them to the sample means of the 165 buildings located in the City of London, or to the 
particular values assumed. Namely we assume that the building is designed by a TA, is 
outside a Height Restricted Area, is not listed, was built in the 2010s and is brand new (no 
depreciation age), has 1 basement floor, has A/C, and is Grade A office space – our highest 
designation. Other independent variables are assumed to be their sample means for the City 
of London. These values are shown in Table 9. 
 
Using these assumed values combined with the time-dummy coefficient estimates from Table 
7 we calculate an estimated sale-price/m2 time-series for this hypothetical building at 8 and 
27-floors across the study period. The results are displayed in Figure 5 along with estimates 
for the cost/m2 of expensive TA and standard architect buildings by number of floors. 
 
As we can see from the substantial gap between the estimated building price and cost of 
construction as represented in Figure 5, there appears to be a considerable rent to be earned 
from securing planning permission to build ‘tall’; even when using a TA. This has been true 
regardless of market conditions since at least 1997. Note that in Figure 5, differences between 
8 and 27-floor building costs £/m2 are indistinguishable. This is because the fixed cost of land 
is divided among greater total floorspace in the 27-floor building, and therefore in spite of 
higher construction costs £/m2, the 8 and 27-floor buildings total cost £/m2 for each architect 
type is practically identical. Conservatively assuming a £8,000/m2 price achieved in 
201119,20on our standardised City of London site, we find that an 8-floor standard architect 
building would earn profits of £56m while the 27-floor expensive TA building would earn 
profits of £129m: implying economic rents of £73m21. Since the two projects are mutually 
exclusive, if sufficient capital can be raised and if additional design and construction costs are 
in fact the only extra costs associated with employing a TA, then other things equal the 27-
floor TA building is the superior investment22. 
 
19 At 2011 ‘prime’ rent levels, £8,000/m2 would suggest a very plausible yield of 6.78%. Source: Gardiner & 
Theobald.  
20 Year of sale and construction are assumed identical. However, since construction costs rise monotonically 
over the period, construction costs would be marginally lower than 2011 values for a new building sold in 2011 
due to construction in fact beginning several years prior to 2011. 
21 See Table A10.  
22 The greater cost of capital was subsumed in construction costs. 
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These results are formalized in Figure 6. On the vertical axis we have marginal revenues from 
the sale of each additional floor23. On the horizontal access we have the number of floors in 
the building, which is a close approximation to the supply of space. 𝑓𝑟 represents the normal 
height restriction imposed on buildings by local councils, which in the City of London is 
approximately 8-floors. 𝑓𝑡 is the floor height achievable with a TA outside a Height 
Protected Area, which according to our estimates is 27-floors. 𝑓𝑡∗ and 𝑓𝑠∗ represent the 
number of floors required to equate marginal construction costs with marginal revenues of an 
additional floor for a trophy and standard architect designed building respectively: the heights 
at which building profits are maximised. In a partial equilibrium setting and using our cost 
data we find that standard-cost buildings will achieve profit maximisation at about 90-floors 
and TAs at about 84-floors. Profit from building 𝑓𝑟 = 8-floors is 𝜋8 + П8 (assuming with a 
standard architect), and profit from building 𝑓𝑡 = 27 floors with a TA is П8 + П27. The 
additional cost of the 27-floor TA building arising as a result of the increased design and 
construction costs relative to the standard architect is 𝜋8 +  𝜋27. Therefore rents accruing to 
the 𝑓𝑡 = 27-floor TA building for building tall are П8 + П27 − 𝜋8 − П8 = П27 − 𝜋8. The 
gross social costs attributable to height restrictions for a TA building of 𝑓𝑡∗ = 84-floors are 
supernumerary construction costs of 𝜋8 + 𝜋27 +  𝜋84 and a deadweight loss of  П84, whereas 
for a standard architect building gross social costs are deadweight losses of 𝜋27 + П27 + 𝜋84 + П84 + 𝜋90: which is equivalent to the total economic rents theoretically available to 
a flawless political entrepreneur. 
 
Taking our office price and cost information and applying them to hypothetical standard and 
TA buildings of 8, 27, 84, and 90 floor heights respectively we can estimate the magnitude of 
these profits and social losses24. Using our data we find that; 𝜋8 = £3m, П8 = £53m, 𝜋27 = 
£5m, П27 = £76m, 𝜋84 = £17m, П84 = £149m, and 𝜋90 = £13m. This suggests that for a new 
TA office building in the City of London height restrictions prevent the developer and 
therefore society from realising gross gains of 𝜋27 + П27 + 𝜋84 + П84 +𝜋90 = £260m by 
restricting a standard architect to build 8-floors as opposed to profit maximising 90. TAs in 
the right location however are able to claw back some of these lost social gains through 
23 Note that Marginal Revenue per Floor is assumed to be downward sloping because the net lettable to gross 
floorspace  ratio decreases with building height, and not because of assuming a downward sloping demand 
curve with respect to additional floors. Indeed this assumption is conservative given the rental premium 
obtainable from higher floors (Koster et al. 2013). 
24 Appendix 4: Calculating Economic Rents: TA Size Increases and Profitability. 
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height concessions from planners to the tune of some £73m25. These results are summarised 
in Table 10. 
 
Of course this analysis is only for the gross costs of a single hypothetical building. As such it 
represents a partial equilibrium outcome, since if restrictions were relaxed the total supply of 
office space would greatly increase, the price of office space would fall, construction costs 
might rise, and optimal building heights would therefore decrease until the marginal cost of 
space was again in line with now lower marginal revenues. It is also important to repeat that 
the partial equilibrium estimation above omits any aesthetic or other external benefits which 
may arise from building height controls or the use of TAs. This last assumption is at least 
based on the observation the TAs neither add value per m2 to the buildings they design nor – 
as far as our data reveal – to surrounding office buildings. 
 
In order to estimate the net social welfare loss/benefit associated with building height 
controls and the employment of TAs to appropriate resulting rents we would require hedonic 
estimation of the value of any external benefits and estimation of a general equilibrium model 
of office and construction markets. Although these further extensions are beyond the 
possibilities of the data, the high costs of the planning controls (£260m for an average 
building) arising from these extremely conservative estimates of office value in one of the 
most permissive local planning authorities in London (The City of London) point to 
significant potential problems with the current planning regime in terms of overall welfare 
generation. 
 
Given the apparent substantial rents (£73m) to be earned from hiring a TA to build tall in 
non-Height Protected Areas, the natural question to ask is why developers do not all seek and 
acquire rents this way? The most likely answer is that of course there are no £50 notes lying 
around on the pavement, let alone £73 million pound notes. The estimates made so far 
assume no extra costs beyond those associated with actual construction. There are likely to be 
two additional and important sources of cost however. The first is extra costs negotiating a 
way through the process of development control ultimately to obtain permissions to build and 
the costs of delay this imposes. The second is more intangible. It is the higher expected rate 
25 Section 106 concessions allow the government to capture some of these potential rents from developers. 
27 
 
                                                 
‘Iconic Design’ as deadweight loss: rent acquisition by design in the constrained London office 
market 
 
of return that would be required by the developer to offset for the greater risks that trying to 
game the planning regulations imposes. Above all the outcome will be more uncertain. 
 
Kufner (2011) argues that planning applications for tall buildings in London require extra 
time to process and we provide some evidence in Tables 11 and 12 to support such claims. 
There is also likely to be a substantial increase in the uncertainty of the outcome. An increase 
in uncertainty associated with attempting to build higher using a TA will be translated by the 
developer into higher risk. Developers will therefore demand a greater expected return. Mayo 
and Sheppard (2001) refer to this type of costly, time-consuming, and uncertain process and 
outcome as ‘stochastic development control’. They found that the regulatory variance 
(riskiness) of the development process was more important in reducing building supply than 
the actual length of planning delay. Furthermore, there may be additional planning costs 
when attempting to build exceptionally tall. For instance city planners generally require 
additional and more extensive impact assessments for tall buildings26, legal assistance may be 
protracted, the architect may be asked to successively redesign the proposal at various stages 
of the planning negotiation27, the planning authority may take additional time to deliberate28, 
and permission may still be ultimately refused at the local or national level (Kufner, 2011). 
Therefore, in order to assess the actual profit incentives facing developers to hire TAs one 
should rescale expected returns by a discount rate commensurate with the additional planning 
risks and delays, and account for the additional costs of submitting a large scale development 
proposal to a local authority. Consequently the estimate above that £73 million in rents can be 
captured merely by hiring a TA is very substantially inflated. Indeed if the development 
process is a competitive one, then it could be that the most appropriate interpretation of the 
£73 million ‘rents’ acquired by employing a TA to develop in a non-Height Protected area of 
the City of London is, in fact, an estimate of the hidden compliance costs imposed by the 
British planning system. These costs are the result of an interaction between its use of a 
negotiable and so uncertain ‘development control’ process for making decisions and the tight 
26 Additional assessments are: impact on TV/radio and air traffic assessment; more extensive environmental 
impact, sunlight and daylight assessment; wind-tunnel assessment, London views management framework 
assessment (LVMF) and Tower of London world heritage site assessment. These assessments require 
consultation with: London City airport, BAA safeguarding team, Royal Parks, Mayor of London, Surveyor to 
the Tower of London, Surveyor to the Fabric of St Paul’s Cathedral, International Council on Monuments and 
Sites (UNESCO), Design Council/CABE, adjoining LPAs on development which is likely to affect land in the 
LPA, LPAs with Strategic Views identified in LVMF. 
27 Powell (2006) for instance shows how at least 10 successive design proposals of Norman Foster’s ‘Gherkin’ 
at 30 St Mary Axe were given to the City of London for review until their final approval. 
28 Kufner (2011) suggests that these additional regulatory demands increase the duration of the planning 
approval process for tall buildings by from 1 to 2.5 years. 
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restriction imposed on the supply of commercial space creating rents. To investigate this 
issue of uncertainty and greater costs in at least an illustrative way, data was obtained from 
the City of London on the development histories of six office buildings approved between 
1999 and 2009. This sample of buildings was purposely split evenly between ‘average’ height 
and ‘tall’ buildings. Table 11 compares the proposed and accepted sizes of these buildings, 
and Table 12 shows their planning approval timeframes. 
 
From Table 11 we see that both ‘average’ and ‘tall’ buildings may have their initially 
proposed sizes either increased or decreased before final planning approval although the 
variation observed for ‘tall’ buildings greatly exceeds that for the conventional ones. In Table 
12, time elapsed to resolve the first planning application is perhaps the best metric for direct 
comparison of planning delay because once the first application has been accepted, future 
application approvals are generally processed more quickly29. Taking a look at planning 
application timescales, Table 12 appears to show that first applications for ‘tall’ buildings 
require between 6-18 months of additional deliberation before a decision and two of the three 
were ultimately decided by the Cabinet minister responsible whereas this was true of none of 
the normal buildings. Taken together with the additional assessment requirements noted in 
footnote 26, there appear to be substantial additional costs imposed by attempting to build 
tall. Unfortunately these various costs are so difficult to estimate with any certainty that our 
building cost consultants Gardiner & Theobald were unable to quote an expected value for 
them. 
 
In addition to these planning costs and uncertainties associated with building tall there is a 
further possible complicating factor: the speed with which TA buildings can be let. The TA 
rents estimated here assume that upon sale the building will have achieved the same 
occupancy rate as the sample average (88%). Of course in reality new developments are 
likely to be speculative, and it is far from certain that the building will be fully let on 
completion. Indeed, major projects with planning permission are routinely paused or 
abandoned in London due to a failure to secure a sufficient number of pre-lets. Any 
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difference in the ability of average compared to tall buildings to secure first tenants and then 
become fully-let may further offset apparent economic rents and so reduce actual profits30. 
 
We look at this – at least for this small sample of buildings – in Table 13. We see that, 
unsurprisingly, the bespoke (built for specific occupiers) Riverbank House and ‘Gherkin’ 
buildings were quick to obtain their first tenants. They achieved the fastest first and complete 
lettings of, respectively, the ‘average’ and ‘tall’ buildings. It took the ‘tall’ ‘Gherkin’ 69 more 
months to achieve this than the ‘average’ Riverbank House, however. Looking at the non-
bespoke buildings the two other ‘average’ buildings achieved first lettings between 16-43 
months and full lettings 28-60+ months before the other two ‘tall’ buildings. This small case 
study suggests that in general tall/large buildings do indeed struggle to secure full tenancy 
compared to their smaller counterparts. 
 
Yet another possible way in which the employment of a TA might influence developers’ 
expected revenues would be if TA buildings systematically conceded different rent-free 
periods in order to attract tenants. Note that since building sales can (and generally are) timed 
by developers to coincide with full occupation, exceptional rent-free concessions to TAs 
would not necessarily show up in the sale price/m2 analysis of Table 731; nevertheless such 
differentials would be relevant to any aspiring developer. However, the results reported in 
Appendix 2 provide no evidence that rent-free periods vary significantly between type of 
architect or the amount of space leased. 
 
In sum, it appears that at least a substantial proportion of the additional £73m ‘rent’ estimated 
above needs to be set against identifiable additional costs and the additional time (6-18 
months) and expense, incurred in obtaining planning approval for tall buildings, and the 
longer period required to fully let such a building (16-60+ months). Assuming the TA 
building could; (i) be let for rents of £538/m2 per year32, (ii) receive gradual lettings and a 24 
month additional wait to fully let the building from construction start (taking a total of 48 
months), and therefore sell it, and (iii) interest rates of 10%; the net cost to the developer of 
30 For instance, ‘The Shard’ 32 London Bridge didn’t secure a single office tenant until nearly 10 months after 
its opening. 
31 Note that it is superfluous to test for increased rents in TA buildings, since any rental-price anomalies would 
directly translate into higher sale prices, which were not observed in Table 7. 
32 Source: Gardiner & Theobald. This assumption yields annual rents for our hypothetical 8 and 27-floor 
building of £2m and £5m/year if fully let. 
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this slower take-up would be the difference in the gain in total rental payments over the 
longer letting period of £8m, and the cost in additional interest payments on the construction 
loan of £22m. On net therefore, this letting delay costs the developer £14m. These results are 
summarised in Table 14. We then must also add the unquantifiable costs associated with the 
required higher rate of expected return to the developer to compensate for the risky business 
of going down the Trophy Architect route and trying to build tall rather than taking the much 
less risky route provided by a building of standard permitted heights. Assuming that 
developers cannot earn supernormal returns would suggest that these ‘unquantifiable’ costs 
are equivalent to £73m − £14m = £59m. 
 
6. Causation 
We have been arguing that the causal relationship is that planning restrictions are 
exceptionally tight in London making space scarce so that if it is possible to obtain a 
permission to put more lettable building space on a given site there is a potential ‘rent’ 
available to the developer and that the employment of a TA is a means by which developers 
can game the system to obtain such permission. Thus employing a TA is a rent-seeking 
mechanism. There are however at least two alternative possible explanations for our finding 
that TAs do provide very much more lettable space on a given site. The first might be that 
firms wanting to build prestigious buildings to make a statement may both build tall and 
employ a TA to do so. Another possibility might be that the technical skills required to design 
and build tall buildings are rare and highly skewed in their distribution to TAs. These two 
alternative causal explanations are explored in Appendix 3, where we have collected data on 
the bespoke status (that is buildings commissioned by a firm for its own occupation) of all the 
‘tall’ – over 20 storey – buildings and modern TA buildings in London. We find no evidence 
that either tall or TA buildings are systematically more likely to be bespoke. Furthermore in 
Appendix 3, the second alternative explanation for our results – that only TAs have the 
capability to build tall – is also rejected. Table compares the tallest buildings in five 
international cities; selected because they are known to have less restrictive land use 
regulatory systems than London. In these five cities only 2.3% of tall buildings were designed 
by TAs compared to 24.3% in London. Moreover in the two least regulated cities, Brussels 
(which had the lowest estimated level of regulatory tax of any European office centre in 
Cheshire and Hilber, 2008) and Benidorm, not a single tall building was designed by a TA. 
Moreover, this second possible explanation can also be countered by noting that our very 
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definition of TA buildings means that buildings which were designed by a TA before they 
won a relevant award are not considered to be ‘TA buildings’. This fact means that in 
practice many buildings by the same designer have different ‘TA’ statuses.33 Although 
architects can certainly gain skills as they progress throughout their career, it is unlikely that 
tall building know-how is always or even often gained simultaneously with ‘trophy’ 
recognition. Clearly the ability to design tall buildings is not a skill restricted to the architects 
we define as TAs. 
 
7.  Conclusion 
We have come a long way to answering one of the questions posed at the start: why does the 
incidence of tall buildings vary so much across cities? London has very few because of very 
tight regulation combined with high costs in negotiating exceptions by using a TA. While it is 
a partial equilibrium result, the profit maximising height for a new office building in London, 
if such a building could be built employing a normal architect, would be 90 floors while 
normally new office buildings are only 8 floors. That such a tall building would be profit 
maximising reflects the restrictions on London’s supply of office space investigated in 
Cheshire and Hilber (2008). 
 
This paper provides evidence consistent with Krueger’s 1974 analysis. If you have a system 
of regulation which imposes quantitative restrictions on the supply of some ‘good’ it will 
create rents. This provides an incentive for actors to try to appropriate those rents: rent-
seeking behaviour. In the planning system operating in London we find that agents can 
appropriate those rents literally by design. They can employ TAs who, where the regime is at 
all flexible – that is in the areas not absolutely but discretionally regulated for height – can 
use their prestige or superior aesthetic skills to persuade planners and politicians to permit 
more building space on a given site, notably by allowing a taller building. We cannot 
discriminate between the alternative ways that TAs are able to persuade decision makers to 
allow them to build taller: it could be aesthetic quality – which is subjective, or it could be the 
signalling power of a major lifetime achievement award. ‘Trophy’ architect buildings, 
however, are a lot taller – 19 floors taller – on average. This is because the system is one in 
which each significant decision is in some sense negotiated. Even if the local jurisdiction 
33 One Canada Square (50F) and 25 Bank Street (33F) are two such buildings. Both were built by current TA 
Cesar Pelli, but only 25 Bank Street was constructed after Cesar Pelli had won a relevant award. 
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rejects the proposal (the evidence suggests there are repeated rejections, followed by 
negotiations, followed by revised proposals) there is still a process of appeal. This in turn can 
then be followed by an appeal to the national political process. The final decision-making 
power lies with the Cabinet minister responsible (now the Secretary of State for Communities 
and Local Government). To pursue an appeal so far is only worth it for very large and 
expensive proposed developments. The examples of the planning process illustrated in Tables 
12 and 13 illustrate that at least in these instances two thirds of the proposals for tall buildings 
were determined at this level.  
 
The extra space a TA can stack on a given site increases the overall sale-price of a typical 
building they design, on a typical site, by an average of 140% (from £82m to £197m). Using 
construction cost data from Gardiner & Theobald our results suggests that with a 
straightforward application of these additional revenues and allowing for the additional direct 
costs entailed in employing a TA with a building having the mean characteristics of such 
buildings, then the rent achievable on an average site in the City of London would be £73m.  
 
However, while £73m may be a best estimate of the value of the rents that employing a TA 
appears to generate, it is at best a substantial overestimate of any ‘profits’. This is because 
hiring a TA does not just involve additional direct design and construction costs – which we 
allow for – but it also involves a significantly longer, more complex and much more 
uncertain planning and letting process. These costs we cannot completely measure. We do 
not have data on how many TA buildings are conceived and on design plans commissioned 
but which are never even proposed. We do not have specific data on TA designed proposals 
which are unsuccessful. However we have measured an increase of 6-18 months in the 
average time between initial application and application acceptance, and increases in the time 
needed to achieve full occupancy of between 28-60+ months associated with tall TA as 
compared to normal architect buildings. This longer letting period appeared to cost a 
developer using a TA an additional expected £14m, but other costs were unquantifiable. 
Furthermore there will almost certainly be a higher discount rate applied for the extra risk and 
uncertainty that gaming the planning system likely entails. All these costs mean that the 
expected ‘rent’ acquired by TAs for a typical City of London site is much less than £73m. 
Indeed if we turn the telescope around the other way so to speak and assume now that large 
denomination bank notes are not lying around on the pavements of London to be picked up, 
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the £73m could be interpreted as simply a measure of the costs imposed by the planning 
system if it is to be gamed successfully; a measure of the difference in compliance costs of 
building a normal building with a normal architect and a tall one using a TA.  
 
The result that TAs do not increase the sale-price per square metre of office buildings may be 
new to the literature. Although previous studies have found a positive effect on the ‘price’ of 
both officially recognized and subjectively ‘good’ office architecture34, these employed rents 
and not transaction prices as their dependent variable. As a result they may not have captured 
the additional costs associated with the ownership of an architecturally iconic building, 
including the increased chance in the British context that it would ultimately be added to a 
Conservation Area or Listed. If landlords can pass on some but not all of these additional 
costs to tenants, the result will be lower revenues and sale prices for owners in spite of higher 
rents for tenants. If true, this could reconcile the apparent paradox between this paper’s 
findings and existing research. This interpretation is bolstered by the fact that when Fuerst et 
al., (2011) use office sale-prices as opposed to rents they also fail to find a significant price 
effect for TAs35. It is, moreover, consistent with the finding of Eichholtz et al. (2010) that the 
bankable value of ‘green buildings’ lies in their energy saving properties, measured in Energy 
Star ratings, and not in their less tangible green characteristics as reflected by LEED 
certification. 
 
Rent-seeking behaviour is, in welfare terms, a deadweight loss. However assuming that, 
consistent with our findings, TAs do not increase – even reduce – the per m2 sale price of 
office buildings, the existence of external benefits to good architecture – for which we find 
some supporting evidence – implies that the gap between the sale price (internal benefits) of 
buildings with good architecture and the total benefits such buildings provide to the public 
may be positive and significant. To the extent that this is true, good architecture would be 
underprovided by the private market and developers would require external incentives to 
employ the services of TAs, and thereby (potentially) generate some additional external 
benefits; thus adding to total welfare derived from the stock of buildings. The way in which 
34 Hough and Kratz (1983), Vandell and Lane (1989). 
35 Fuerst et al. (2011) however did find a significantly positive price effect (17%) on their so-called ‘signature 
architects’: 63% of which comprised buildings designed by Skidmore, Owings, and Merrill: most of which 
would not be included in our measure of TAs because the principal architects who had won the relevant awards 
(Louis Skidmore (d.1962), Nathaniel Owings (d.1984), and Gordon Bunshaft (ret.1979): 1957, 1983 AIA Gold 
Medal, and 1988 Pritzker prize winners, respectively) were either dead or retired at the time the relevant 
buildings in Fuerst et al.’s sample were designed. 
34 
 
                                                 
‘Iconic Design’ as deadweight loss: rent acquisition by design in the constrained London office 
market 
 
developers who hire TAs are able to flex London’s regulatory regime to build taller could be 
regarded as just such an indirect subsidy, delivering more good architecture than would the 
market in the absence of regulation.  
 
Whether this is welfare improving, however, is speculative and beyond the scope of this 
paper. We note that our evidence does not of itself show any external benefits associated with 
TAs’ buildings. Rather it shows there is a possible premium paid per m2 for office buildings 
with a greater density of Conservation Area and Listed buildings within a range of 300m. The 
statistical significance of both these variables disappears in our preferred specification, 
however: Model (5) – where we separate TAs into those building when height restrictions 
were not absolute and everywhere in London, and those building earlier – the ‘Pre-Modern 
TAs’. Thus our data reveal no significant premium being paid by commercial purchasers of 
TA buildings, and at best ambiguous evidence for such a premium relating to a higher local 
density of Conservation Areas and Listed buildings. Consequently for the employment of 
TAs to be transparently adding to welfare at all, this value would have to be derived from the 
preferences and willingness to pay of tourists and the inhabitants of London. Here there 
appears to be some evidence suggesting that there may be such values, although compared to 
the costs we have estimated these are small (Ahlfeldt, 2013). 
 
Certainly seeking and acquiring rents by employing a TA has costs, most of which (such as 
employing lawyers and planning specialists to pursue appeals against initial rejections) look 
like deadweight losses; and if there is a case for more high quality architecture than the 
market will deliver, this is almost certainly a suboptimal method of generating that increase. 
The current planning regime also delivers these rents more or less randomly to lucky 
developers and lucky TAs who succeed in flexing the regulations, and at a social cost for a 
single standard office building of at least £260m and likely orders of magnitude more for the 










Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Data used in Building Size Regressions 
 N Mean Median St. Dev. Maximum Minimum 
TA Bldg 43 - - - - - 
Modern TA 36 - - - - - 
Pre-Modern TA 7 - - - - - 
Modern TA Bldg Built outside 
Height Protected Area 
15 - - - - - 
Floorspace (m2) 515 10,496 5,126 15,539 113,665 181 
Above Ground Floors 515 8.06 7 6.52 87 2 
Footprint (m2) 515 1,683 1,031 1,711 10,689 61 
Site area (m2) 515 1,963 1,167 2,215 15,970 61 
Floorspace/site area 515 4.85 4.54 2.80 26.20 0.35 
Footprint/site area 515 0.93 1 0.15 1 0.09 
Average Employment 600m 515 47,971 40,940 31,603 129,954 1,584 
Located in Conservation Area 258 - - - - - 
Built in Height Protected Area 118 - - - - - 
Listed 70 - - - - - 
Built Pre-1950s 167 - - - - - 
Built 1950s 18 - - - - - 
Built 1960s 31 - - - - - 
Built 1970s 33 - - - - - 
Built 1980s 83 - - - - - 
Built 1990s 77 - - - - - 
Built 2000s 98 - - - - - 
Built 2010s 8 - - - - - 
Local Planning Authority       
Camden 50 - - - - - 
City of London 165 - - - - - 
Westminster 188 - - - - - 
Hackney 5 - - - - - 
Hammersmith 11 - - - - - 
Islington 32 - - - - - 
Kensington 5 - - - - - 
Lambeth 6 - - - - - 
Southwark 26 - - - - - 
Tower Hamlets 13 - - - - - 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Data used in Hedonic Regressions 
 N Mean Median St. Dev. Maximum Minimum 
TA Bldg 58 - - - - - 
Modern TA 42 - - - - - 
Pre-Modern TA 16 - - - - - 
Modern TA Bldg Built outside Height 
Protected Area 
16 - - - - - 
Price (£m)– 625 72.03 34.50 113.88 1,111.90 1.45 
Price (£)/ Floorspace (m2) 625 7,012 6,485 3,263 25,477 1,608 
Price (£)/ Site area (m2) 625 34,219 28,549 25,899 258,718 1,768 
Floorspace (m2) 625 10,296 5,758 13,717 113,665 181 
Above Ground Floors 625 7.88 7 5.11 45 3 
Footprint (m2) 625 1,749 1,200 1,611 9,128 66 
Site area (m2) 625 2,002 1,415 1,963 13,571 66 
Floorspace/site area 625 4.82 4.60 2.58 
26.20 0.35 
Footprint/site area 
625 0.93 1 0.15 1 0.09 
Employment Density 600m 625 50,868 45,291 33,069 141,964 2,117 
Within Conservation Area 349 - - - - - 
Built in Conservation Area 143 - - - - - 
Listed 79 - - - - - 
Built Pre-1950s 196 - - - - - 
Built 1950s 26 - - - - - 
Built 1960s 32 - - - - - 
Built 1970s 38 - - - - - 
Built 1980s 103 - - - - - 
Built 1990s 116 - - - - - 
Built 2000s 112 - - - - - 
Built 2010s 2 - - - - - 
Local Planning Authority       
Camden 59 - - - - - 
City of London 216 - - - - - 
Westminster 217 - - - - - 
Hackney 4 - - - - - 
Hammersmith 16 - - - - - 
Islington 37 - - - - - 
Kensington 4 - - - - - 
Lambeth 5 - - - - - 
Southwark 33 - - - - - 
Tower Hamlets 20 - - - - - 
Docklands 14 - - - - - 
Submarket       
City Core 188 - - - - - 
City Fringe 51 - - - - - 
Docklands 14 - - - - - 
Midtown 99 - - - - - 
North Central 13 - - - - - 
South Central 13 - - - - - 
Southern Fringe 25 - - - - - 
West Central 20 - - - - - 
West End 202 - - - - - 
Year Sold       
1998 4 - - - - - 
1999 9 - - - - - 
2000 15 - - - - - 
2001 30 - - - - - 
2002 26 - - - - - 
2003 38 - - - - - 
2004 53 - - - - - 
2005 57 - - - - - 
2006 83 - - - - - 
2007 95 - - - - - 
2008 43 - - - - - 
2009 63 - - - - - 
2010 81 - - - - - 
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Table 3: Conservation Areas in central London boroughs  
 Number of 
areas 




City of Westminster 55 75% 1967 
Camden 39 50% 1968 
Islington 40 50% 1968 




Table 4: Can TAs Build Bigger? Dependent variable total floorspace/ site area 
 











      
Modern TA outside Height Protected Area  8.733*** 8.098*** 6.798*** 6.626*** 
  (1.772) (1.546) (1.602) (1.599) 
TA 3.700*** 0.624* -0.134 -0.110 -0.137 
 (0.908) (0.367) (0.361) (0.376) (0.376) 
Built in Height Protected Area -0.580** -0.148 -0.753*** -0.592*** -0.666*** 
 (0.225) (0.174) (0.224) (0.208) (0.209) 
Average Office Permission Refusal Rate -10.27*** -10.16*** -8.405*** -11.73*** -11.25*** 
 (1.717) (1.603) (1.498) (3.380) (3.201) 
Built 1950s   -0.000857 0.0276 0.115 
   (0.367) (0.370) (0.358) 
Built 1960s   0.553 0.612 0.743 
   (0.527) (0.517) (0.523) 
Built 1970s   0.580* 0.556* 0.675** 
   (0.317) (0.321) (0.319) 
Built 1980s   0.541 0.340 0.394 
   (0.353) (0.277) (0.273) 
Built 1990s   0.889*** 0.714*** 0.711*** 
   (0.249) (0.253) (0.252) 
Built 2000s   1.761*** 1.591*** 1.666*** 
   (0.260) (0.256) (0.254) 
Built 2010s   5.425*** 5.688*** 5.656*** 
   (1.646) (1.818) (1.857) 
City of London    -0.377 -1.166** 
    (0.449) (0.512) 
Docklands    3.380* 3.497** 
    (1.766) (1.748) 
Average Employment 600m     1.56e-05*** 
     (5.02e-06) 
Constant 5.549*** 5.442*** 4.806*** 5.198*** 4.643*** 
 (0.192) (0.184) (0.182) (0.429) (0.443) 
      
Observations 515 515 515 515 515 
R-squared 0.197 0.378 0.453 0.487 0.498 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 5: Can TAs Build Taller? Dependent variable: No. of floors above ground level 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Floors Floors Floors 
    
Modern TA outside Height Protected Area 21.11*** 18.93*** 18.77*** 
 (3.956) (4.585) (4.669) 
TA 0.397 0.424 0.400 
 (0.868) (0.888) (0.887) 
Built in Height Protected Area -1.969*** -1.679*** -1.746*** 
 (0.424) (0.395) (0.402) 
Average Office Permission Refusal Rate -2.770 -5.988 -5.553 
 (3.585) (8.580) (8.602) 
Built 1950s 1.133*** 1.151*** 1.230*** 
 (0.376) (0.388) (0.373) 
Built 1960s 4.802*** 4.886*** 5.005*** 
 (1.333) (1.315) (1.327) 
Built 1970s 3.580*** 3.509*** 3.616*** 
 (0.858) (0.879) (0.892) 
Built 1980s 1.501** 1.138** 1.187** 
 (0.703) (0.506) (0.513) 
Built 1990s 1.904*** 1.571*** 1.569*** 
 (0.452) (0.481) (0.481) 
Built 2000s 3.144*** 2.834*** 2.902*** 
 (0.416) (0.404) (0.411) 
Built 2010s 17.33*** 17.74*** 17.71*** 
 (6.485) (6.738) (6.804) 
City of London  -0.316 -1.030 
  (1.088) (1.204) 
Docklands  5.800 5.906 
  (4.068) (4.089) 
Average Employment 600m   1.41e-05 
   (1.23e-05) 
Constant 6.151*** 6.521*** 6.019*** 
 (0.353) (1.034) (1.121) 
    
Observations 515 515 515 
R-squared 0.548 0.565 0.567 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 6: Can TAs Get a Bigger Building Footprint? 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Footprint/ Site area Footprint/ Site area Footprint/ Site area Footprint/ Site area 
     
Modern TA outside Height Protected Area 0.0172 -0.0148 -0.0342 0.0202 
 (0.0629) (0.0699) (0.0690) (0.0668) 
TA -0.0613** -0.0571** -0.0601** -0.0590** 
 (0.0260) (0.0274) (0.0257) (0.0262) 
Built in Height Protected Area 0.0586*** 0.0577*** 0.0495*** 0.0444*** 
 (0.0162) (0.0171) (0.0167) (0.0171) 
Average Office Permission Refusal Rate -0.686*** -1.402*** -1.348*** -1.364*** 
 (0.119) (0.406) (0.372) (0.369) 
Built 1950s -0.0336 -0.0250 -0.0153 -0.0117 
 (0.0338) (0.0323) (0.0317) (0.0320) 
Built 1960s -0.157*** -0.152*** -0.137*** -0.122*** 
 (0.0448) (0.0443) (0.0455) (0.0439) 
Built 1970s -0.152*** -0.144*** -0.131*** -0.120*** 
 (0.0369) (0.0365) (0.0351) (0.0353) 
Built 1980s -0.0818*** -0.0797*** -0.0737*** -0.0702*** 
 (0.0195) (0.0204) (0.0194) (0.0197) 
Built 1990s -0.0739*** -0.0682*** -0.0686*** -0.0640*** 
 (0.0196) (0.0217) (0.0207) (0.0212) 
Built 2000s -0.0473*** -0.0446** -0.0362* -0.0277 
 (0.0180) (0.0200) (0.0200) (0.0210) 
Built 2010s -0.0982** -0.0839** -0.0876* -0.0362 
 (0.0395) (0.0394) (0.0466) (0.0566) 
City of London  -0.0946** -0.183*** -0.186*** 
  (0.0467) (0.0512) (0.0509) 
Docklands  0.0512 0.0644 0.0815 
  (0.0484) (0.0475) (0.0550) 
Average Employment 600m   1.75e-06*** 1.79e-06*** 
   (3.75e-07) (3.72e-07) 
Floors    -0.00290 
    (0.00256) 
Constant 1.034*** 1.122*** 1.059*** 1.077*** 
 (0.0119) (0.0456) (0.0411) (0.0445) 
     
Observations 515 515 515 515 
R-squared 0.173 0.191 0.236 0.243 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 7: What do TAs yield in price/m2 of building? Dependent variable: ln(price/m2) 











      
TA 0.0469 -0.0522 0.0728 -0.0157  
 (0.0567) (0.0562) (0.0504) (0.0501)  
Modern TA     0.0645 
     (0.0615) 
Pre-Modern TA     -0.168** 
     (0.0846) 
Within Conservation Area 0.0916** 0.0698* 0.0143 0.0128 0.00931 
 (0.0361) (0.0361) (0.0326) (0.0324) (0.0324) 
Listed 0.112** 0.102** 0.0569 0.0646 0.0770* 
 (0.0483) (0.0515) (0.0428) (0.0455) (0.0457) 
Ln(Office Permission Refusal Rate 9yr 
Moving Average) 
0.0433*** 0.0464*** 0.0198 0.0232* 0.0240* 
 (0.0130) (0.0125) (0.0143) (0.0138) (0.0137) 
Ln(Employment 600m) 0.0891*** 0.0721*** 0.202*** 0.186*** 0.185*** 
 (0.0262) (0.0254) (0.0328) (0.0316) (0.0315) 
Ln(Conservation Area Density 300m) -0.0299* -0.0281 0.00351 -0.000715 0.00244 
 (0.0179) (0.0176) (0.0172) (0.0168) (0.0168) 
Ln(Listed Building Density 300m) 0.0735*** 0.0777*** 0.0216 0.0277 0.0288 
 (0.0182) (0.0177) (0.0195) (0.0189) (0.0188) 
Ln(Park and Garden Density 300m) 0.0196*** 0.0170*** 0.0143*** 0.0129*** 0.0124*** 
 (0.00421) (0.00409) (0.00411) (0.00397) (0.00396) 
Ln(Nearest Rail Station Distance) 0.0304 0.00749 -0.000238 -0.0170 -0.0185 
 (0.0295) (0.0287) (0.0265) (0.0258) (0.0257) 
Ln(Number of Above-Ground Floors) 0.152*** 0.184*** 0.0651 0.0915** 0.0782* 
 (0.0491) (0.0508) (0.0442) (0.0457) (0.0460) 
Ln(Depreciation Age) -0.0180*** -0.00795 -0.0186*** -0.00856 -0.00957 
 (0.00675) (0.00691) (0.00594) (0.00606) (0.00606) 
Ln(Basements/Total Floors) -0.00649 -0.0144* -0.00967 -0.0160** -0.0147** 
 (0.00834) (0.00817) (0.00734) (0.00721) (0.00720) 
A/C 0.292*** 0.230*** 0.200** 0.163** 0.176** 
 (0.0875) (0.0856) (0.0776) (0.0758) (0.0758) 
EG Office Grade A/B 0.0784* 0.0793* 0.0775* 0.0705* 0.0682* 
 (0.0457) (0.0459) (0.0404) (0.0404) (0.0403) 
EG Office Grade A 0.143*** 0.0892** 0.145*** 0.0906** 0.0893** 
 (0.0407) (0.0417) (0.0361) (0.0369) (0.0368) 
Ln(Percent Occupied) 0.0236*** 0.0151* 0.0237*** 0.0165** 0.0156** 
 (0.00836) (0.00812) (0.00738) (0.00716) (0.00714) 
Single Tenant 0.0532 0.0936*** 0.0565* 0.0935*** 0.0910*** 
 (0.0354) (0.0348) (0.0311) (0.0306) (0.0305) 
Decade Built NO YES NO YES YES 
Submarket NO NO YES YES YES 
Year Sold YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant 5.882*** 6.215*** 5.060*** 5.335*** 5.306*** 
 (0.524) (0.508) (0.524) (0.508) (0.507) 
      
Observations 625 625 625 625 625 
R-squared 0.335 0.394 0.497 0.542 0.546 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 8: What Value does a TA add to a site? Dependent variable: ln(price/site area m2) 









     
Modern TA outside  
Height Protected Area 
0.759*** 0.723*** 0.730*** 0.701*** 
 (0.222) (0.209) (0.201) (0.193) 
Modern TA 0.280*** 0.0820 0.306*** 0.135 
 (0.0762) (0.0803) (0.0813) (0.0842) 
Pre-Modern TA -0.165 -0.171 -0.269 -0.261 
 (0.170) (0.162) (0.188) (0.185) 
Within Conservation Area -0.0218 -0.0205 -0.116** -0.111 
 (0.0595) (0.0800) (0.0557) (0.0749) 
Built in Height Protected Area -0.110* -0.150* -0.0326 -0.0596 
 (0.0653) (0.0893) (0.0570) (0.0834) 
Listed 0.0417 0.0325 0.00597 -0.00913 
 (0.0660) (0.0681) (0.0620) (0.0658) 
Ln(Office Permission Refusal Rate 
9yr Moving Average) 
0.0543*** 0.0575*** 0.0321* 0.0335* 
 (0.0186) (0.0182) (0.0192) (0.0182) 
Ln(Employment 600m) 0.288*** 0.273*** 0.257*** 0.243*** 
 (0.0469) (0.0453) (0.0546) (0.0535) 
Ln(Conservation Area Density 
300m) 
-0.101** -0.113** -0.0281 -0.0458 
 (0.0475) (0.0484) (0.0339) (0.0345) 
Ln(Listed Building Density 300m) 0.115*** 0.127*** 0.0644* 0.0747** 
 (0.0436) (0.0448) (0.0351) (0.0366) 
Ln(Park and Garden Density 300m) 0.0322*** 0.0297*** 0.0161*** 0.0151*** 
 (0.00531) (0.00535) (0.00562) (0.00566) 
Ln(Nearest Rail Station Distance) 0.0217 -0.00655 -0.00173 -0.0241 
 (0.0449) (0.0467) (0.0449) (0.0466) 
Ln(Depreciation Age) -0.0262*** -0.0131 -0.0247*** -0.0120 
 (0.00879) (0.00911) (0.00803) (0.00852) 
Ln(Basements/Total Floors) 0.00366 -0.00871 0.00415 -0.00729 
 (0.0121) (0.0117) (0.0112) (0.0106) 
A/C 0.551*** 0.510*** 0.453*** 0.435*** 
 (0.116) (0.118) (0.146) (0.144) 
EG Office Grade A/B 0.346*** 0.349*** 0.302*** 0.306*** 
 (0.0596) (0.0597) (0.0563) (0.0563) 
EG Office Grade A 0.425*** 0.365*** 0.379*** 0.331*** 
 (0.0569) (0.0560) (0.0537) (0.0533) 
Ln(Percent Occupied) 0.0340** 0.0251** 0.0326** 0.0251** 
 (0.0140) (0.0127) (0.0131) (0.0125) 
Single Tenant 0.0158 0.0630 0.0198 0.0602 
 (0.0473) (0.0459) (0.0442) (0.0439) 
Decade Built NO YES NO YES 
Submarket NO NO YES YES 
Year Sold YES YES YES YES 
Constant 5.906*** 6.408*** 6.154*** 6.636*** 
 (0.637) (0.641) (0.640) (0.661) 
     
Observations 625 625 625 625 
R-squared 0.489 0.529 0.580 0.609 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 9: City of London means about assumed values 
Variable Values assumed floor bldg 
Modern TA   e† 
Within Conservation Area   1‡ 
Listed 1 
Office Permission Refusal Rate  0.28% 
Employment Density 600m  84,942 
Conservation Area (100m2)  within 300m  1,209 
Listed Buildings (100m2) within 300m 362 
Parks & Gardens (100m2) within 300m 54 
Distance to Nearest Station (m) 226 
Above Ground Floors 8/27 
Depreciation Age (yrs) 1 
Basements 1 
A/C e 
Office Space Grade A e 
Percent Occupied   88% 
Single Tenant e 
†ln(e)=1, i.e. the dummy variable is indicated in log form. 
‡ln(1)=0, i.e. the dummy variable is not indicated in log form. 
 
 
Table 10: Development Profits and Rents 
8F Standard Architect Profit 𝜋8 + П8 £56m 
27F TA Profit П8 + П27 £129m 
TA Rents П27 − 𝜋8 £73m 
Potential Economic Rents / Gross Social Loss 𝜋27 + П27 + 𝜋84 + П84 +𝜋90 £260m 
 
 
Table 11: Planning Histories Building Size 













Clements House 20 Gresham Street NO 8 8   32,396   32,022   -1% 
Riverbank House 2 Swan Lane NO 11 11   39,567   42,291   +7% 
Premier Place 2-5 Devonshire Square NO 9 9   27,000   23,226  -14% 
Heron Tower 110 Bishopsgate NO 34 46   32,516   42,873 +24% 
‘Gherkin’ 30 St Mary Axe YES 90 40 285,658   47,035  -84% 
‘Walkie-Talkie’ 20 Fenchurch Street NO 42 36   91,000   84,913    -7% 
 
 
Table 12: Planning Histories Building Approval 




















Clements House 20 Gresham Street 3 3 10.0 10 12/1997 NO 
Riverbank House 2 Swan Lane 2 2  7.5 10 06/2002 NO 
Premier Place 2-5 Devonshire Square 5 5    2.6†   4 02/1997 NO 
Heron Tower 110 Bishopsgate 2 2 14.5  22 07/1999 YES 
‘Gherkin’ 30 St Mary Axe 2 1 14.5     16+‡ 02/1996 NO 
‘Walkie-Talkie’ 20 Fenchurch Street 2 2 13.5 16 05/2005 NO 
†Simultaneous applications were submitted and decided concurrently. 
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Table 13: Planning History Lettings 


















Clements House 20 Gresham Street NO 06/2006 05/2008  23 06/2010 48 
Riverbank House 2 Swan Lane YES 09/2009 10/2006 -35 10/2006 -35 
Premier Place 2-5 Devonshire Square NO 07/1999 11/2000  16 11/2000  16 
Heron Tower 110 Bishopsgate NO 07/2007 10/2010 39 NOT YET      76+* 
‘Gherkin’ 30 St Mary Axe YES 07/1995      06/1998** 34 06/1998  34 
‘Walkie-Talkie’ 20 Fenchurch Street NO 07/2007 06/2012 59 NOT YET          76+*** 
†Construction is considered to have started once demolition of the previous building commenced. 
* Completed 03/2011; only 45% let as of 02/2013; 63% let as of 09/2013. 
**100% effectively let through purchase of scheme by Swiss RE on 06/1998 conditional on planning permission which was later granted 
08/2000. 
***Completion expected 01/2014: construction paused between 04/2009-02/2011; 57% pre-let as of 09/2013. 
 
 
Table 14: Quantifiable costs of delay 
 Total rents received until sale Extra financing cost Net quantifiable costs of delay 
8-floor standard architect £2m after 24months £25m×10%×2 years= £5m - 
27-floor trophy architect £10m after 48months £68m×10%×4 years = £27m - 
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MAPS & FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: The 546 postcode sectors and 515 office locations 
 
 













Figure 4: Estimated total land, construction and design costs per m2 of building height 
by type of architect 
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Figure 5: Price per m2 for mean characteristics TA building in City of London 
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Appendix 1: Dropping the tallest buildings from the sample 
 
Table A1: Robustness: Omitting tallest TA buildings: dependent variable: 
floorspace/site m2 









Omit 2 Greatest 
Floorspace/ 
Site Area 
Omit 3 Greatest 
     
Modern TA outside Height Protected Area 6.626*** 6.089*** 5.354*** 4.149*** 
 (1.599) (1.526) (1.571) (1.332) 
TA -0.137 -0.142 -0.0283 0.128 
 (0.376) (0.380) (0.364) (0.340) 
Built in Height Protected Area -0.666*** -0.688*** -0.670*** -0.643*** 
 (0.209) (0.208) (0.202) (0.196) 
Average Office Permission Refusal Rate -11.25*** -11.30*** -11.23*** -10.88*** 
 (3.201) (3.207) (3.150) (3.050) 
Built 1950s 0.115 0.110 0.113 0.112 
 (0.358) (0.358) (0.359) (0.355) 
Built 1960s 0.743 0.757 0.775 0.824 
 (0.523) (0.520) (0.518) (0.511) 
Built 1970s 0.675** 0.679** 0.673** 0.671** 
 (0.319) (0.319) (0.317) (0.317) 
Built 1980s 0.394 0.436 0.432 0.410 
 (0.273) (0.269) (0.266) (0.262) 
Built 1990s 0.711*** 0.772*** 0.781*** 0.760*** 
 (0.252) (0.244) (0.239) (0.233) 
Built 2000s 1.666*** 1.637*** 1.656*** 1.667*** 
 (0.254) (0.251) (0.246) (0.242) 
Built 2010s 5.656*** 5.800*** 4.699** 2.891** 
 (1.857) (1.911) (1.905) (1.278) 
City of London -1.166** -1.138** -1.102** -1.079** 
 (0.512) (0.514) (0.493) (0.463) 
Docklands 3.497** 2.892* 3.118* 3.574** 
 (1.748) (1.693) (1.704) (1.684) 
Average Employment 600m 1.56e-05*** 1.52e-05*** 1.42e-05*** 1.60e-05*** 
 (5.02e-06) (5.05e-06) (4.89e-06) (4.48e-06) 
Constant 4.643*** 4.661*** 4.686*** 4.562*** 
 (0.443) (0.443) (0.440) (0.426) 
     
Observations 515 514 513 512 
R-squared 0.498 0.467 0.422 0.395 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table A1 successively removes the TA buildings with the greatest (Floorspace/Site Area) ratio in the 
sample. These are 8 Canada Square (26.02), ‘The Cheesegrater’ 122 Leadenhall (25.04), and ‘The Shard’ 
32 London Bridge Street (23.62).  
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Table A2: Robustness: Omitting tallest TA buildings: Dependent variable: No. floors 






Omit 2 Tallest 
Floors 
Omit 3 Tallest 
     
Modern TA outside Height Protected Area 18.77*** 14.63*** 13.05*** 12.22*** 
 (4.669) (3.238) (3.215) (3.140) 
TA 0.400 0.929 1.170* 1.181* 
 (0.887) (0.663) (0.652) (0.652) 
Built in Height Protected Area -1.746*** -1.645*** -1.605*** -1.632*** 
 (0.402) (0.343) (0.334) (0.332) 
Average Office Permission Refusal Rate -5.553 -4.138 -3.924 -3.961 
 (8.602) (8.073) (7.932) (7.910) 
Built 1950s 1.230*** 1.223*** 1.228*** 1.223*** 
 (0.373) (0.346) (0.346) (0.346) 
Built 1960s 5.005*** 5.191*** 5.235*** 5.257*** 
 (1.327) (1.310) (1.311) (1.313) 
Built 1970s 3.616*** 3.612*** 3.601*** 3.606*** 
 (0.892) (0.889) (0.888) (0.887) 
Built 1980s 1.187** 1.087** 1.070** 1.124** 
 (0.513) (0.471) (0.460) (0.451) 
Built 1990s 1.569*** 1.457*** 1.463*** 1.543*** 
 (0.481) (0.433) (0.421) (0.409) 
Built 2000s 2.902*** 2.934*** 2.971*** 2.935*** 
 (0.411) (0.377) (0.367) (0.359) 
Built 2010s 17.71*** 11.32*** 8.888** 8.892** 
 (6.804) (4.288) (4.330) (4.326) 
City of London -1.030 -0.977 -0.910 -0.873 
 (1.204) (1.071) (1.030) (1.028) 
Docklands 5.906 7.682** 8.248** 7.494* 
 (4.089) (3.835) (3.875) (3.897) 
Average Employment 600m 1.41e-05 2.32e-05*** 2.20e-05*** 2.16e-05** 
 (1.23e-05) (8.70e-06) (8.40e-06) (8.43e-06) 
Constant 6.019*** 5.460*** 5.466*** 5.481*** 
 (1.121) (0.984) (0.969) (0.966) 
     
Observations 515 514 513 512 
R-squared 0.567 0.550 0.516 0.479 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table A2 successively removes the TA buildings from the sample in order of most above ground floors. 
These are ‘The Shard’ 32 London Bridge Street (87F), ‘The Cheesegrater’ 122 Leadenhall Street (48F), 
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Table A3: Robustness: Omitting greatest (Price/Site area) TA building sales: dependent variable 
ln(price/site m2) 














Omit 51 Lime Street 
Sale 
     
Modern TA outside  
Height Protected Area 
0.701*** 0.649*** 0.549*** 0.485*** 
 (0.193) (0.176) (0.152) (0.146) 
Modern TA 0.135 0.137 0.142* 0.143* 
 (0.0842) (0.0845) (0.0844) (0.0841) 
Pre-Modern TA -0.261 -0.268 -0.277 -0.278 
 (0.185) (0.184) (0.182) (0.181) 
Within Conservation Area -0.111 -0.119 -0.131* -0.130* 
 (0.0749) (0.0754) (0.0755) (0.0756) 
Built in Height Protected Area -0.0596 -0.0602 -0.0619 -0.0613 
 (0.0834) (0.0836) (0.0842) (0.0842) 
Listed -0.00913 -0.0100 -0.0119 -0.0110 
 (0.0658) (0.0658) (0.0657) (0.0657) 
Ln(Office Permission Refusal Rate 9yr 
Moving Average) 
0.0335* 0.0305* 0.0281 0.0269 
 (0.0182) (0.0182) (0.0181) (0.0181) 
Ln(Employment 600m) 0.243*** 0.229*** 0.215*** 0.216*** 
 (0.0535) (0.0527) (0.0514) (0.0513) 
Ln(Conservation Area Density 300m) -0.0458 -0.0315 -0.0109 -0.0120 
 (0.0345) (0.0351) (0.0315) (0.0319) 
Ln(Listed Building Density 300m) 0.0747** 0.0794** 0.0878*** 0.0855*** 
 (0.0366) (0.0334) (0.0287) (0.0288) 
Ln(Park and Garden Density 300m) 0.0151*** 0.0150*** 0.0147*** 0.0152*** 
 (0.00566) (0.00567) (0.00564) (0.00565) 
Ln(Nearest Rail Station Distance) -0.0241 -0.0304 -0.0257 -0.0274 
 (0.0466) (0.0464) (0.0454) (0.0453) 
Ln(Depreciation Age) -0.0120 -0.0133 -0.0152* -0.0150* 
 (0.00852) (0.00867) (0.00879) (0.00881) 
Ln(Basements/Total Floors) -0.00729 -0.00829 -0.00987 -0.0107 
 (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0106) 
A/C 0.435*** 0.432*** 0.433*** 0.432*** 
 (0.144) (0.142) (0.140) (0.140) 
EG Office Grade A/B 0.306*** 0.308*** 0.295*** 0.294*** 
 (0.0563) (0.0564) (0.0562) (0.0562) 
EG Office Grade A 0.331*** 0.326*** 0.331*** 0.331*** 
 (0.0533) (0.0532) (0.0528) (0.0528) 
Ln(Percent Occupied) 0.0251** 0.0244** 0.0234* 0.0231* 
 (0.0125) (0.0123) (0.0122) (0.0122) 
Single Tenant 0.0602 0.0587 0.0497 0.0468 
 (0.0439) (0.0437) (0.0434) (0.0433) 
Decade Built YES YES YES YES 
Submarket YES YES YES YES 
Year Sold YES YES YES YES 
Constant 6.636*** 6.688*** 6.619*** 6.638*** 
 (0.661) (0.651) (0.639) (0.640) 
     
Observations 625 622 620 619 
R-squared 0.609 0.594 0.589 0.584 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table A3 successively removes all sales of each trophy architect building in the sample in order of greatest 
(Price/Site area) ratio. These are 8 Canada Square (Apr-07 £258,718/m2, Nov-08 £214,872/m2, Nov-09 
£198,077/m2), 25 Canada Square (Feb-04 £225,629/m2, Nov-07 £211,163/m2), and ‘The Willis Building’ 51 Lime 
Street (May-08 £186,829/m2). Although present in the building-size sample, ‘The Shard’ 32 London Bridge Street 
and ‘The Cheesegrater’ 122 Leadenhall Street have never sold.  
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Appendix 2: Effect of TAs on Rent Free periods 
 
Another way in which TA buildings might be able to influence developers’ returns would be if their 
buildings systematically had shorter or longer rent-free periods. Many office buildings have such deals in 
order to attract first and new tenants. 
 
Table A4: Rent-Free Period Regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 








     
TA Building 5.203 1.115 -0.442 -0.913 
 (3.440) (3.052) (3.033) (3.013) 
Lease Length (years)  1.467*** 1.102*** 1.178*** 
  (0.269) (0.249) (0.234) 
Lease Floorspace m2   0.000354 0.000368 
   (0.000274) (0.000276) 
Building Depreciation    0.334 
    (0.372) 
Contract Start 2003 3.734 10.93* 13.24 12.72 
 (4.174) (6.328) (8.593) (8.700) 
Contract Start 2004 -2.889 4.119 8.349 8.276 
 (4.446) (6.460) (8.900) (8.895) 
Contract Start 2005 10.70** 16.13** 19.03** 18.68** 
 (4.188) (6.586) (8.846) (8.878) 
Contract Start 2006 -2.438 3.140 5.909 5.947 
 (3.975) (6.123) (8.643) (8.648) 
Contract Start 2007 -9.401 -0.215 0.780 0.210 
 (5.807) (7.151) (8.963) (9.034) 
Contract Start 2008 -8.924 5.365 8.307 7.738 
 (5.958) (7.691) (9.713) (9.909) 
Contract Start 2009 15.33 25.31** 24.70** 24.43** 
 (11.05) (10.74) (10.98) (10.98) 
Contract Start 2010 2.714 13.84* 15.22 13.61 
 (5.591) (7.167) (9.275) (9.479) 
Contract Start 2011 -6.540 9.913 11.45 9.985 
 (4.245) (6.892) (9.070) (9.512) 
Contract Start 2012 -1.448 11.01 13.21 11.57 
 (4.125) (6.815) (8.905) (9.224) 
Contract Start 2013 1.234 15.76** 17.47** 15.03 
 (5.499) (6.504) (8.625) (9.288) 
Constant 17.27*** -9.729 -8.693 -9.913 
 (3.463) (7.561) (9.113) (9.054) 
     
Observations 76 76 76 76 
R-squared 0.287 0.567 0.598 0.603 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Building Depreciation = The number of years between the building construction date/most recent refurb and the lease start. 
 
The analysis in Table A4 above consists of a sample of 17 leases from TA and 59 leases from standard 
buildings comprising 47 buildings altogether, and tests whether TA buildings yielded greater rent-free 
periods in a series of hierarchical regressions. All leases in the sample contained a positive rent-free period 
incentive. Robust standard errors are used as White tests reject homoskedasticity. The results above 
provide no evidence that tenants in TA buildings can demand exceptional rent-free concessions. If 




Appendix 3:  Causal Interpretation of Relationship between TA Design and 
Additional Stories? 
 
As discussed in Section 6 of the paper there are two potential objections to the causal 
interpretation we have put onto the strong relationship between whether a building is in a 
non-height restricted area and designed by a modern TA, on the one hand, and its additional 
height and resulting increased value of the site all else controlled for, on the other. The first 
of these objections is that companies wishing to make a landmark statement may tend to 
commission both taller buildings and TAs to be their designers. The second potential 
alternative interpretation we can think of is that designing tall buildings is particularly 
demanding of architectural skill so tall buildings are more likely to be designed by famous – 
or trophy – architects. 
 
The crux of the first objection to our interpretation of causation is that bespoke developments 
cause both buildings to be tall and TAs to be chosen as their architect. If either one of these 
premises is false, then the bespoke status of developments cannot be a source of spurious 
causal inference of TAs on increased building height. In fact we find no evidence to support 
either such relationship. To address the first possible relationship, we take TA status as 
given36 and determine whether bespoke status can influence building height. Table A5 shows 
that there have been 36 modern office buildings built by TAs in London. Of these 12 or 33% 
were commissioned to be built by a firm specifically for their own use. Following our earlier 
analyses, Table A6 shows a series of hierarchical regressions on the height of modern TA 
buildings depending on bespoke status and a number of controls. Under none of the 
specifications is the bespoke variable a statistically significant determinant of building height. 
Robust standard errors are shown because heteroskedasticity is identified in the data with a 
White test; homoskedastic standard errors yield the same result. 
 
To address the second implicit assumption underpinning this possible criticism of causation 
we next take tall building status as given37 and determine whether bespoke status influences 
the choice of a TA. Table A7 shows the 44 office buildings in London that have ever been 
built above 20 floors, 19 or 43% of these buildings were bespoke, 13 or 30% of them by TAs, 
and 6 or 46% of these TA buildings were also bespoke. A comparison of means test does not 
36 We do this to ensure the feasibility of data collection. 
37 For the same reason as footnote 36. 
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reject the null hypothesis that among London’s tallest offices there is no difference between 
the probability that a bespoke development will chose a TA compared to non-TA (p = 0.80). 
Therefore bespoke developments do not appear to be either taller or to preferentially choose 
trophy architects. Either of these findings alone would be sufficient to invalidate the inference 
that bespoke status accounts for our observed relationship between TAs and building height, 
but together this conclusion is stronger still. 
 
As a way of addressing the second potential criticism of our causal interpretation – that only 
TAs have the requisite skills to design tall buildings, Table A8 provides data on tall buildings 
from a selection of cities around the world. These cities are selected because they have 
comparatively flexible restrictions on building tall. They are: Chicago, Houston, Brussels, 
Benidorm (Spain), and Sao Paulo. Chicago and Houston are at the least restrictive end of the 
US spectrum of restrictiveness with respect to commercial buildings at least. Brussels was the 
office centre in Western Europe identified by Cheshire and Hilber (2008) as having the 
lowest estimated value of Regulatory Tax. Benidorm, especially when it was developed as a 
resort town during the 1970s and 1980s had both lax restriction and lax enforcement, and 
while Sao Paolo does have significant restrictions on very tall buildings it is quite 
unrestrictive with respect to buildings up to 100 metres. The sample of buildings in these 
cities consisted of those buildings above 100m: corresponding to roughly 25 floors. 
 
We can see that only a small fraction (2.3%) of the tallest buildings in these five international 
cities was by a TA, and that this fraction is an order of magnitude lower than in London. 
There are also no TA buildings at all in Brussels or Benidorm – both cities with a far higher 
incidence of tall buildings per capita than London. A comparison of means test rejects with 
high confidence the probability that there is no difference between the incidence of tall TA 
buildings in London and the other cities. This result contradicts the idea that only TAs have 
the skills to build tall. It is also suggestive that there is a unique process at work in London 
which associates tall buildings with TAs: we argue that this process is rent-seeking in the face 




Table A5: Are bespoke buildings taller? Population of Modern TA buildings in London 
Building Name Address TA Award Floors Year 
Approved 
Borough Bespoke Speculative Conservation 
Area Built 
‘The Shard’ 32 London Bridge 
Street 
Renzo Piano RIBA Gold 1989, 
AIA Gold 2008, 
Pritzker 1998 
87 2003 Southwark NO YES NO 
‘The Cheesegrater’ 122 Leadenhall Richard Rogers RIBA Gold 1985, 
Pritzker 2007 
50 2004 City of 
London 
NO YES NO 
 25 Canada Square Cesar Pelli AIA Gold 1995 45 1998 Tower 
Hamlets 
YES NO NO 
 8 Canada Square Norman Foster RIBA Gold 1983, 
Pritzker 1999 
45 1997 Tower 
Hamlets 
YES NO NO 
 30 St Mary Axe Norman Foster RIBA Gold 1983, 
Pritzker 1999 
40 1997 City of 
London 
YES NO NO 
 25 Bank Street Cesar Pelli AIA Gold 1995 33 2001 Tower 
Hamlets 
NO YES NO 
 40 Bank Street Cesar Pelli AIA Gold 1995 33 2001 Tower 
Hamlets 
NO YES NO 
Shell Centre 2 York Road 
 
Howard Robertson RIBA Gold 1949 26 1957 Lambeth YES NO NO 
Willis Building 51 Lime Street Norman Foster RIBA Gold 1983, 
Pritzker 1999 
26 2002 City of 
London 
YES NO NO 
 33 Canada Square Norman Foster RIBA Gold 1983, 
Pritzker 1999 
24 1996 Tower 
Hamlets 
YES NO NO 
 1 Cabot Square Ieoh Ming Pei RIBA Gold 2010, 
AIA Gold 1979, 
Pritzker 1983 
21 1988 Tower 
Hamlets 
NO YES NO 
Moor House 120 London Wall Norman Foster RIBA Gold 1983, 
Pritzker 1999 
19 1998 City of 
London 
NO YES NO 
 88 Wood Street Richard Rogers RIBA Gold 1985, 
Pritzker 2007 
18 1995 City of 
London 
NO NO NO 
New Court St Swithin’s Lane Rem Koolhas RIBA Gold 2004, 
Pritzker 2000 
16 2006 City of 
London 
YES NO YES 
Central St Giles 1-13 St Giles 
High Street 
Renzo Piano RIBA Gold 1989, 
AIA Gold 2008, 
Pritzker 1998 





Richard Rogers RIBA Gold 1985, 
Pritzker 2007 
14 1996 City of 
London 
YES NO YES 
 10 Bishop’s 
Square 
Norman Foster RIBA Gold 1983, 
Pritzker 1999 
13 2001 Tower 
Hamlets 
NO NO NO 
 1 London Wall Norman Foster RIBA Gold 1983, 
Pritzker 1999 
13 2000 City of 
London 
NO YES YES 
Paddington 35 North Wharf Richard Rogers RIBA Gold 1985, 12 2001 Westminster NO YES NO 
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Waterside Road Pritzker 2007 
Langbourne House 10 Fenchurch 
Street 
Denys Lasdun RIBA Gold 1977 11 1982 City of 
London 
NO YES NO 
 100 Wood Street Norman Foster RIBA Gold 1983, 
Pritzker 1999 
11 1997 City of 
London 
NO YES NO 
Gibbs Building 215 Euston Road Michael & Patricia 
Hopkins 
RIBA Gold 1994 10 2000 Camden YES NO YES 
City Hall 110 The Queen’s 
Walk 
Norman Foster RIBA Gold 1983, 
Pritzker 1999 
10 1998 Southwark YES NO YES 
The Ark 201 Talgarth 
Road 
Ralph Erskine RIBA Gold 1987 10 1989 Hammersmith NO YES NO 
ITN Building 200 Gray’s Inn 
Road 
Norman Foster RIBA Gold 1983, 
Pritzker 1999 
10 1989 Camden YES NO NO 
Milton Gate 1 Moor Lane 
 
Denys Lasdun RIBA Gold 1977 9 1986 City of 
London 
NO YES NO 
Holborn Place 33 Holborn 
Circus 
Norman Foster RIBA Gold 1983, 
Pritzker 1999 
9 1995 City of 
London 
NO YES YES 
One New Change 9-36 Cheapside Jean Nouvel RIBA Gold 2001, 
Pritzker 2008 
8 2005 City of 
London 
NO YES NO 
 50 Finsbury 
Square 
Norman Foster RIBA Gold 1983, 
Pritzker 1999 
8 1998 Islington NO YES YES 
 10 Gresham 
Street 
Norman Foster RIBA Gold 1983, 
Pritzker 1999 
8 1997 City of 
London 





Richard Rogers RIBA Gold 1985, 
Pritzker 2007 
8 1999 Tower 
Hamlets 
NO NO YES 
 1 Poultry 
 
James Stirling Pritzker 1981 7 1986 City of 
London 
NO NO YES 
Stirling Square 5-7 Carlton 
Gardens 
James Stirling Pritzker 1981 7 1988 Westminster NO YES YES 
Tower Place West Tower Hill Norman Foster RIBA Gold 1983, 
Pritzker 1999 
7 1998 City of 
London 
NO YES YES 
Broadwick House 15-17 Broadwick 
Road 
Richard Rogers RIBA Gold 1985, 
Pritzker 2007 





Richard Rogers RIBA Gold 1985, 
Pritzker 2007 
5 1991 Westminster YES NO NO 
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Table A6: Bespoke status on Modern TA building height 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Floors Floors Floors Floors Floors 
      
Bespoke 1.876 1.737 2.177 2.190 0.0470 
 (4.605) (4.357) (4.066) (4.127) (4.443) 
Built in Height Protected Area -22.53*** -23.51*** -27.17** -27.45** -26.12** 
 (5.826) (5.451) (10.19) (11.01) (11.54) 
(Bespoke)×(Built outside Height Protected Area)     5.582 
     (9.410) 
Average Office Permission Refusal Rate 16.55 37.41 -55.33 -58.78 -57.18 
 (39.33) (40.86) (57.58) (61.60) (61.76) 
Permission Granted 1980s  0.663 8.164 8.865 12.29 
  (5.280) (10.76) (12.58) (14.22) 
Permission Granted 1990s  9.755* 14.61 15.44 18.27 
  (5.615) (11.43) (14.02) (14.86) 
Permission Granted 2000s  17.51** 22.25 23.25 26.71 
  (7.902) (13.85) (16.82) (18.44) 
City of London   -14.43 -12.91 -11.89 
   (10.94) (8.660) (8.843) 
Docklands   -9.708 -9.860 -10.75 
   (14.05) (14.56) (14.70) 
Average Employment 600m    -3.32e-05 -5.18e-05 
    (0.000126) (0.000128) 
Constant 30.63*** 19.44*** 30.95*** 31.74*** 28.29** 
 (5.371) (4.728) (8.763) (10.25) (12.76) 
      
Observations 36 36 36 36 36 
R-squared 0.454 0.587 0.619 0.620 0.624 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table A7: Are bespoke buildings designed by TAs? Population of London office buildings >20-floors 






Local Authority Demolished 
‘The Shard’ 32 London Bridge Street Renzo Piano 
 
YES NO 87 310m 2012 Southwark - 
One Canada Square 1 Canada Square Cesar Pelli 
 
NO NO 50 235m 1991 Tower Hamlets - 
‘The Cheesegrater’ 122 Leadenhall Street Richard Rogers 
 
YES NO 48 225m 2014 City of London - 
Tower 42 25 Old Broad Street Richard Seifert 
 
NO YES 47 183m 1980 City of London - 
Heron Tower 110 Bishopsgate Kohn Pedersen Fox 
 
NO NO 46 203m 2011 City of London - 
HSBC Tower 8 Canada Square Norman Foster 
 
YES YES 45 200m 2002 Tower Hamlets - 
- 25 Canada Square Cesar Pelli 
 
YES YES 45 220m 2002 Tower Hamlets - 
‘The Gherkin’ 30 St Mary Axe 
 
Norman Foster YES YES 40 180m 2003 City of London - 
‘The Walkie-Talkie’ 20 Fenchurch Street 
 
Rafael Vinoli NO NO 36 160m 2014 City of London - 
Euston Tower 
 
286 Euston Road Sidney Kaye, Eric 
Firmin & Partners 
NO NO   36† 124m 1970 Camden - 
Britannic House 
 
1 Ropemaker Street F. Milton Cashmore 
& Niall D. Nelson 
NO YES   35‡ 122m 1967 City of London - 
Broadgate Tower 201 Bishopsgate Skidmore, Owings, 
and Merrill 
NO NO 33 164m 2009 City of London - 
- 25 Bank Street Cesar Pelli YES NO 33 153m 2003 Tower Hamlets 
 
- 
- 40 Bank Street Cesar Pelli YES NO 33 153m 2003 Tower Hamlets 
 
- 
Centre Point 103 New Oxford Street Richard Seifert 
 
NO NO 33† 121m 1965 Camden - 





21-24 Millbank Ronald Ward & 
Partners 
NO YES 32 118m 1961 Westminster - 
- 10 Upper Bank Street Kohn Pedersen Fox 
 
NO YES 31 151m 2003 Tower Hamlets - 
King’s Reach Tower 
 
Stamford Street Richard Seifert NO NO   29‡ 111m 1978 Southwark - 
Empress State Building Empress Approach Stone, Toms & 
Partners 
NO NO   28‡ 
 
100m 1961 Hammersmith - 
Portland House Bressenden Place Howard Fairbairn & NO NO 28 102m 1963 Westminster - 
‘Iconic Design’ as deadweight loss: rent acquisition by design in the constrained London office market 
 
 Partners 
The Willis Building 
 
51 Lime Street Norman Foster YES YES 28 125m 2007 City of London - 
Drapers Gardens 12 Throgmorton Street 
 
Richard Seifert NO YES 28 99m 1967 City of London 2007 
Commercial Union 
Tower 
1 Undershaft Gollins, Melvin, 
Ward 
NO YES 26 118m 1969 City of London - 
Shell Centre 
 
2 York Road Howard Robertson YES YES 26 107m 1962 Lambeth - 
Stock Exchange Tower 125 Old Broad Street F. Milton Cashmore 
& Partners 
NO YES   26‡ 99m 1969 City of London - 
Limebank House 
 
168 Fenchurch Street Richard Seifert NO YES 26 93m 1969 City of London 1998 
Kleinwort Benson 
Building 
20 Fenchurch Street 
 
William H. Rogers NO YES 25 91m 1968 City of London 2008 
New London Bridge 
House 
25 London Bridge Street Richard Seifert 
 
NO NO 25 94m 1967 Southwark 2010 
- 
 
99 Bishopsgate Richard Seifert NO NO 25 104m 1976 City of London - 
The London Studios 58-72 Upper Ground 
 
Elsom Pack & 
Roberts 
NO YES 25 82m 1973 Southwark - 
Southwark Towers 
 
32 London Bridge Street T.P. Bennett & Son NO NO 25 100m 1976 Southwark 2009 
- 
 
33 Canada Square Norman Foster YES YES 24 105m 1999 Tower Hamlets - 
Marble Arch Tower 
 
55 Bryanston Street T.P. Bennett & Son NO NO 23 82m 1966 Westminster - 
Market Towers 
 
1 Nine Elms Lane GMW Architects NO YES 23 75m 1975 Lambeth - 
- 6-8 Bishopsgate 
 
GMW Architects NO YES 23 88m 1981 City of London - 
Westminster City Hall 64 Victoria Street Burnet, Tait and 
Partners 
NO NO 22 76m 1966 Westminster - 
Century House 
 
100 Westminster Bridge 
Road 
Devereux Architects NO NO 21 73m 1959 Lambeth - 
New Scotland Yard 10 Broadway Chapman, Taylor 
and Partners 
NO NO 21 67m 1962 Westminster - 
City Tower 40 Basinghall Street Burnet, Tait and 
Partners 
NO NO 21 69m 1957 City of London - 
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Angel Court 1 Angel Court Fitzroy Robinson 
and Partners 
NO NO 21 94m 1980 City of London - 
- 200 Aldersgate Street Fitzroy Robinson 
and Partners 
NO NO 21 91m 1992 City of London - 
One Cabot Square 1 Cabot Square Pei, Cobb, Freed & 
Partners 
YES NO 21 89m 1991 Tower Hamlets - 
†Building was allowed exceptional height as a concession for funding local roadworks. 
‡Additional floor(s) added since construction. Data represents originally constructed floor count. 





Table A8: Breakdown of buildings >100m and TAs by city 

















London 7 57 30 20 1 6 14 24.56% 
Chicago 111 301 123 160 16 2 9 2.99% 
Houston 40 88 60 19 3 6 5 5.68% 
Brussels 15 17 15 2 0 0 0 0.00% 
Benidorm 384 26 0 25 1 0 0 0.00% 
Sao Paulo 20 231 75 142 9 5 1 0.43% 
Total - 720 303 368 30 19 29 4.03% 
 
  
‘Iconic Design’ as deadweight loss: rent acquisition by design in the constrained London office 
market 
 
Appendix 4: Calculating Economic Rents: TA Size Increases and Profitability 
 
In order to estimate how much extra floorspace TAs are able to stack on a given site we 
cannot simply add 19 floors as in Table 5. If this were the case then the additional 
floorspace/site area due to TAs estimated in Table 4 should equal close to 1938. Instead Table 
4 says it equals 7. Clearly the average floorspace/site area ratio for TA buildings is less than 1 
(in fact closer to .36). However we do not use this estimate as we wish to ensure that we 
compare the costs of TA buildings with the costs of standard architect buildings of the same 
footprint, and using the ratio of floorspace/site area for a given site area does not ensure that 
the building footprint remains comparable. Therefore we run a regression on 
floorspace/footprint in Table A9 and use the results to compute the ratio at which floorspace 
increases due to a TA for a given footprint (we find an additional 9m2 of floorspace per 1m2 
footprint: for every 19 floors). These results are used to compute Table A10 which serves as 
the basis for our discussion of economic rents. 
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Built in Height Protected Area -1.009*** 
(0.245) 
Average Office Permission Refusal Rate -5.150 
(4.409) 
Built 1950s 0.162 
(0.348) 
Built 1960s 2.563*** 
(0.797) 
Built 1970s 1.737*** 
(0.422) 
Built 1980s 0.838*** 
(0.301) 
Built 1990s 1.089*** 
(0.273) 
Built 2000s 1.985*** 
(0.280) 
Built 2010s 6.931*** 
(2.257) 










Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table A10: Trophy and Standard Building Costs and Profits 
Floors Floorspace(m2) Cost (£m) Sale Price (£m) Profit (£m) 
Trophy Architect 8 10,203 28 82 53 
Standard Architect 8 10,203 25 82 56 
Trophy Architect 27 24,672 68 197 129 
Standard Architect 27 24,672 60 197 137 
Trophy Architect 84 58,833 193 470 278 
Standard Architect 84 58,833 167 470 303 
Standard Architect 90 61,747 178 494 316 
Office sale-prices are estimated assuming £8,000/sqm and are invariant to architectural pedigree following empirical results.
64 
Spatial Economics Research Centre (SERC)
London School of Economics
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
Tel: 020 7852 3565
Fax: 020 7955 6848
Web: www.spatialeconomics.ac.uk
SERC is an independent research centre funded by the 
Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), Department 
for Business Innovation and Skills (BIS) and the Welsh  
Government.
